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METHODS AND APPARATUS FOR
DETECTING SPOOFING OF GLOBAL
NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM
SIGNALS USING CARRIER PHASE
MEASUREMENTS AND KNOWN ANTENNA
MOTIONS
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED
APPLICATIONS
This application is a U.S. national stage application under
35 U.S.C. 371 of co-pending International Application No.
PCT/US13/60808 filed on Sep. 20, 2013 and entitled
METHODS AND APPARATUS FOR DETECTING
SPOOFING OF GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE
SYSTEM SIGNALS USING CARRIER PHASE MEA-
SUREMENTS AND KNOWN ANTENNA MOTIONS,
which in turn claims priority to U.S. Provisional Patent
Application No. 61/703,353 filed on Sep. 20, 2012, which is
incorporated by reference herein in its entirety for all pur-
poses.
STATEMENT REGARDING
FEDERALLY-SPONSORED RESEARCH OR
DEVELOPMENT
This invention was made in part with United States
Government support under Grant Nos. NNXIOAL16G
awarded by NASA, and N00014-09-1-0295 awarded by the
Off ce of Naval Research. The United States government has
certain rights in the invention.
BACKGROUND
The U.S. government has been aware of the vulnerability
of unencrypted civilian GNSS signals to spoofing at least
since the Department of Transportation released its Volpe
report in 2001. A spoofer intentionally broadcasts signals
that look like true signals to User Equipment receivers (UE).
These false signals can fool a receiver into an incorrect
determination of its position, receiver clock time, or both.
Spoofing of civilian GNSS signals is straightforward
because their full characteristics are publicly available. It is
relatively easy to synthesize false signals with the same
characteristics. Encrypted military signals, such as the GPS
P(Y) and M codes, are much harder to spoof. One must
break their encryptions or use a meaconing-type attack, an
attack which involves reception and rebroadcast of actual
encrypted signals.
Spoofing of OPS receivers has been in the news recently.
In December 2011, Iran captured a highly classified stealth
drone that belonged to the U.S. government. An Iranian
engineer claimed that they spoofed the drone's GPS in a way
which fooled it into thinking that it was landing at its home
base in Afghanistan. In reality, it was descending into the
hands of waiting Iranian military personnel. It remains
unclear how much of the Iranian claims are true, but their
claims are not outlandish and have to be taken seriously.
In June 2012, a group led by Todd Humphreys of UT
Austin spoofed a small helicopter Uninhabited Air Vehicle
(UAV) using live, on-air spoofing signals as part of a
specially authorized test at White Sands Missile Range, N.
Mex. The UT Austin team caused the UAV to execute
unintended maneuvers by spoofing its GPS-derived position
and velocity. One of the untended maneuvers involved a
near landing when the UAV had been commanded to hover
about 20 m above the ground.
N
Existing anti-spoofing technology known as Receiver
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) will not suffice
to detect sophisticated spoofing attacks. Therefore, a number
of recent and on-going efforts have sought to develop
5 advanced spoofing detection methods that can alert a user to
a sophisticated attack. These methods include advanced
RAIM algorithms that operate at the correlator/discrimina-
tor/tracking-loop level, algorithms that cross-correlate the
unknown encrypted parts of a signal between a potential
victim receiver and a secure receiver, Navigation Message
10 
Authentication (NMA) that relies on proposed insertions of
encrypted authentication elements within the low-bandwidth
navigation message, multiple-antenna techniques, and mov-
ing-antenna techniques
Other references have described multiple-antenna tech-
15 niques that do not perform spoofing detection. Rather, this
class of techniques is used to mitigate spoofing by attenu-
ating it without the need to formally detect it.
Each of the newer techniques has strengths and weak-
nesses. Advanced RAIM methods require only modest
20 changes to receiver software and hardware, but they may
only be able to detect spoofing at the onset of an attack. If
an advanced RAIM algorithm misses the attack during this
short window, then it may go undetected. The cross-corre-
lation techniques can detect spoofing rapidly at any time
25 during an attack, perhaps in as little as 0.2 seconds, but they
rely on a high bandwidth communications link between the
defended receiver and a secure receiver. NMA introduces
encryption-level security into the civilian GNSS community,
but it requires changes to GNSS message structures that are
30 difficult to bring about. It may require additional signal
processing in order ensure against estimation-and-replay by
the spoofer of the NMA message components. NMA tech-
niques may be slow, requiring 10 seconds or more in order
to detect an attack. A UAV may already be in the hands of
35 an enemy by the time such a method discovered the attack.
Multiple-antenna methods can be made reliable and fast if
implemented well, but they require a significant amount of
additional hardware and signal processing. The multi-re-
ceiver cross-correlation technique and the NMA technique
40 share an additional drawback: they offer no protection
against a meaconing-type receive-and-replay attack. Even
an encrypted military signal is vulnerable to a meaconing
attack.
The moving antenna technique can be implemented using
45 simple hardware and algorithms, but the method of conven-
tional teachings requires long observation intervals, and it
does not develop a clearly defined hypothesis test. Further-
more, its reliance on signal amplitude variations as an
indication of spoofing may prove unreliable. A spoofer could
50 easily create time-dependent amplitude variations between
its false signals, and this particular moving-antenna detec-
tion method might interpret these variations as indicating a
non-spoofed situation.
There is a need for methods and systems that do not
55 require explicit or implicit knowledge of exact position or
attitude. There is a need for methods and systems that can
detect spoofing attacks in a stand-alone mode, without the
need for aiding data from some external source or for the
implementation of a new GPS navigation data message.
60 There is a need for methods and systems to provide clear
spoofing detection hypothesis test statistics, threshold val-
ues, and probabilities of false alarm and missed detection.
65
SUMMARY
Methods and systems that can detect GNSS spoofing
attacks and that do not require explicit or implicit knowledge
US 9,958,549 B2
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of exact position or attitude and that provide hypothesis test
statistics, threshold values, and probabilities of false alarm
and missed detection are presented herein below.
In one or more embodiments, the method of these teach-
ings includes moving a receiving location in a predeter- 5
mined articulation pattern while receiving GNSS signals,
high pass filtering carrier phase measurements of received
GNSS signals and the predetermined articulation pattern, the
high pass filtering resulting in estimation of coefficients in an
expression for residuals of the carrier phase measurements, io
determining a likelihood cost function for a non-spoofed
configuration, the likelihood cost function being obtained
from the ratio of probability density functions, results of the
high pass filtering being used in determining said likelihood
cost function, determining another likelihood cost function 15
for a spoofed configuration; a spoofing detection hypothesis
test statistic being a difference of said another likelihood cost
function minimum and said likelihood cost function mini-
mum, results of the high pass filtering being used in deter-
mining said another likelihood cost function, comparing the 20
spoofing detection hypothesis test statistic to a predeter-
mined threshold, the GNSS signals deemed to be spoofed if
the spoofing detection hypothesis test statistic is less than the
predetermined threshold.
In one or more embodiments, the system of these teach- 25
ings includes a receiving location displacement component
configured to move a receiving location with respect to a
position at which the user equipment processes the GNSS
signals, an articulation subsystem configured to provide
driving signals to the receiving location displacement com- 30
ponent and to determine receiving location articulation; the
a articulation subsystem moving a receiving location in a
predetermined articulation pattern while receiving GNSS
signals, a number of midpoint sampler subsystems, each
midpoint sampler subsystem receiving input from a com- 35
ponents of one channel of a conventional GNSS receiver and
providing a beat carrier phase measurement for that one
channel and a spoofing detection hypothesis test component
receiving the receiving location articulation, the beat carrier
phase measurement for each one channel and a PLL phase 40
error discriminator value for each one channel, the beat
carrier phase measurement and the PLL phase error dis-
criminator value for each one channel being used to obtain
a wideband estimate of beat carrier phase for each one
channel, a number of accumulation mid point times, each 45
accumulation mid point time being an accumulation mid
point time for one channel, and a number of unit direction
vectors, each unit direction vector pointing from a GNSS
signal source for one channel; said spoofing detection
hypothesis test component configured to high pass filter 50
carrier phase measurements of received GNSS signals and
the articulation pattern, the high pass filtering resulting in
estimation of coefficients in an expression for the carrier
phase measurement residuals, determine a likelihood cost
function for a non-spoofed configuration, the likelihood cost 55
function being obtained from the ratio of probability density
functions, results of the high pass filtering being used in
determining said likelihood cost function, determine another
likelihood cost function for a spoofed configuration; a
spoofing detection hypothesis test statistic being a difference 60
of said another likelihood cost function minimum and said
likelihood cost function minimum, results of the high pass
filtering being used in determining the another likelihood
cost function, comparing the spoofing detection hypothesis
test statistic to a predetermined threshold, the GNSS signals 65
deemed to be spoofed if the spoofing detection hypothesis
test statistic is less than the predetermined threshold.
4
The present teachings enable civilian Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS) receivers, such as GPS receivers or
receivers for the new European Galileo system and the new
Chinese COMPASS system, to determine whether the
received signals are genuine or whether they are deceptive
signals that have been broadcast by a malicious spoofer. It
detects a spoofing attack by using short segments of beat
carrier-phase time histories that are collected while the
receiver's antenna is undergoing a known, high-frequency
motion profile. The spoofing detection calculations correlate
high-pass-filtered versions of the known antenna motion
with high-pass-filtered versions of the carrier phase varia-
tions. True signals produce a specific correlation pattern, and
spoofed signals produce a recognizably different correlation
pattern if the spoofer transmits its false signals from a single
antenna. The most pronounced difference is that non-
spoofed signals display variations between the beat carrier
phase responses of multiple signals, but all signals'
responses are identical or have an identical component in the
spoofed case. These differing correlation characteristics are
used to develop a hypothesis test in order to detect a
spoofing attack or the lack thereof.
The methods of present teachings need not know about
vehicle attitude a priori, and their spoofing detection tests
can function properly even if the receiver's position solution
has been badly spoofed. The methods of present teachings
use comparisons between multiple carrier-phase signals to
develop explicit spoofing detection tests that have clearly
defined detection thresholds, probabilities of false alarm,
and probabilities of missed detection. The embodiments
discussed here do not require an Inertial Measurement Unit
(IMU) to sense antenna motion, contrary to moving-antenna
systems proposed by others. Instead, motion is implemented
and sensed using a special-purpose mechanical receiving
antenna location displacement component (in one instance,
an antenna deflection system). This motion need not be
known relative to inertial space. Rather, it can be measured
relative to a platform of unknown attitude, position, velocity,
and acceleration. The only requirement is that the articula-
tion system be able to measure virtually all of the high-
frequency content of the motion. On the other hand, the
methods of present teachings could be aided by inertial
sensing if it were available. A high-frequency dithering
motion of the platform that carried the GNSS antenna, if
coupled with inertial sensing, could constitute the principal
motion/sensing system that is necessary to the present
method's GNSS spoofing detection approach.
In one embodiment, the method of present teachings
operates by correlating beat carrier phase time variations
with known high-frequency components of the receiver
antenna's position time history. In the non-spoofed case, the
method of present teachings has the side benefit of yielding
attitude information. The antenna motion, however, need not
have an amplitude large enough or other properties typically
deemed necessary to provide good attitude accuracy.
In one embodiment, the GNSS spoofing detection method
of present teachings has some similarities to certain multi-
antenna methods. The present method also relies on carrier
phase measurements, and the present method also relies in
geometrical differences between the line-of-sight (LOS)
vectors to actual GNSS satellites for non-spoofed signals
and the LOS vector to a spoofer. There are two important
differences between the present method and carrier-phase-
based multi-antenna methods. First, the use of a single
antenna removes the need to resolve carrier-phase biases,
and possibly integer ambiguities, between different anten-
nas. This difference allows the present method to use simpler
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signal processing and to detect spoofing using shorter data
intervals. Second, the present method does not always need
to determine the full 3-axis attitude of the UE. Depending on
the type of antenna motion that it uses, it may only determine
2-axes worth of attitude information. In some cases, how-
ever, it may estimate the full 3-axis attitude as a by-product
of its spoofing detection calculations.
Note that the method of these teachings is effective
against spoofing of both open-source civilian and encrypted
military GNSS signals. Thus, it could detect a meaconing
attack against a U.S. Military SAASM GPS receiver.
Contributions of the present teachings are described
herein below. First, the present teachings describe a new
spoofing detection system based on correlation of beat
carrier phase time variations with known high-frequency
antenna motions. Second, the present teachings develop
precise spoofing detection hypothesis tests for this system,
complete with analyses of false-alarm and missed-detection
probabilities. A number of distinct spoofing detection tests
are developed for various scenarios in which decreasing
amounts of a priori information are available to the detector.
Also described herein below is an evaluation of the an
embodiment of the system of the present teachings. This
evaluation involves tests using truth-model data and tests
using actual live data. Live data for the non-spoofed null
hypothesis is easy to collect by simply observing GPS LI
signals in typical outdoors environments. Live data for
spoofed cases presents a challenge. One set of tests was
conducted in an anechoic chamber using a re-radiated GPS
signal from an outside antenna. The single re-radiating
antenna inside the chamber provided exactly the same
signal-in-space geometrical characteristics as are provided
by a sophisticated spoofer. The other set of live spoofed-case
tests was conducted in conjunction with a recent spoofing
attack test at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.
This test was conducted under the auspices the U.S. Air
Force 746 Test Squadron as a service to the Department of
Homeland Security and with the approval of the FCC.
For a better understanding of the present teachings,
together with other and further objects thereof, reference is
made to the accompanying drawings and detailed descrip-
tion and its scope will be pointed out in the appended claims.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
FIG. 1 shows the Antenna articulation system geometry
relative to base mount and GNSS satellites for spoofing
detection system in the non-spoofed case;
FIG. 2 shows the Antenna articulation system geometry
relative to base mount and GNSS spoofer for spoofing
detection system, spoofed case;
FIG. 3 shows the Antenna articulation system for a
prototype spoofing detector tests: a cantilevered beam that
allows single-degree-of-freedom antenna phase center
vibration along a horizontal axis;
FIG. 4 shows an embodiment of a signal processing block
diagram of a single-satellite receiver channel that provides
inputs to the spoofing detector;
FIG. 4a shows an embodiment of components of the
system of these teachings;
FIGS. 5-11 depict results of embodiments of the method
and system of these teachings; and
FIG. 12 shows a flowchart representation of an embodi-
ment of the method of these teachings.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
The following detailed description is of the best currently
contemplated modes of carrying out these teachings. The
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description is not to be taken in a limiting sense, but is made
merely for the purpose of illustrating the general principles
of these teachings, since the scope of these teachings is best
defined by the appended claims. Although the teachings
5 have been described with respect to various embodiments, it
should be realized these teachings are also capable of a wide
variety of further and other embodiments within the spirit
and scope of the appended claims.
As used herein, the singular forms "a," "an," and "the"
io include the plural reference unless the context clearly dic-
tates otherwise.
Except where otherwise indicated, all numbers expressing
quantities of ingredients, reaction conditions, and so forth
used in the specification and claims are to be understood as
15 being modified in all instances by the term "about."
"Attitude," as used herein, is the orientation of a user
equipment frame with respect to a reference frame. Attitude
is defined in terms of the angles for roll, pitch and yaw.
"Carrier phase" and "beat carrier phase" are used herein
20 in the manner that the terms are used in regards to GNSS or
GPS (see, for example, Lecture 4: GPS part 2, Jeff Frey-
mueller, University of Alaska, or GPS Glossary from GIS
Technical Memorandum 3: Global Positioning Systems
Technology and its Applications in Environmental Programs
25 (EPA/600/R-92/036, February 1992), both of which are
incorporated by reference herein in their entirety and for all
purposes).
A "GNSS software receiver," as used herein, is a GNSS
receiver including an ADC (analog to digital converter), a
30 processor and computer usable media with code for the
functions to be performed or a field programmable gate
array programmed for the functions to be performed.
In one or more embodiments, the method of these teach-
ings includes moving a receiving location in a predeter-
35 mined articulation pattern while receiving GNSS signals
(step 205, FIG. 12), high pass filtering carrier phase mea-
surements of received GNSS signals and the predetermined
articulation pattern (step 215, FIG. 12), the high pass filter-
ing resulting in estimation of coefficients in an expression
40 for residuals of the carrier phase measurements, determining
a likelihood cost function for a non-spoofed configuration
(step 225, FIG. 12), the likelihood cost function being
obtained from the ratio of probability density functions,
results of the high pass filtering being used in determining
45 said likelihood cost function, determining another likelihood
cost function for a spoofed configuration; a spoofing detec-
tion hypothesis test statistic being a difference of said
another likelihood cost function minimum and said likeli-
hood cost function minimum (step 235, FIG. 12), results of
50 the high pass filtering being used in determining said another
likelihood cost function, comparing the spoofing detection
hypothesis test statistic to a predetermined threshold (step
245, FIG. 12), the GNSS signals deemed to be spoofed if the
spoofing detection hypothesis test statistic is less than the
55 predetermined threshold.
In one or more embodiments, the system of these teach-
ings includes a receiving location displacement component
configured to move a receiving location with respect to a
position at which the user equipment processes the GNSS
60 signals, an articulation subsystem configured to provide
driving signals to the receiving location displacement com-
ponent and to determine receiving location articulation; the
a articulation subsystem moving a receiving location in a
predetermined articulation pattern while receiving GNSS
65 signals, a number of midpoint sampler subsystems, each
midpoint sampler subsystem receiving input from a com-
ponents of one channel of a conventional GNSS receiver and
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providing a beat carrier phase measurement for that one
channel and a spoofing detection hypothesis test component
receiving the receiving location articulation, the beat carrier
phase measurement for each one channel and a PLL phase
error discriminator value for each one channel, the beat
carrier phase measurement and the PLL phase error dis-
criminator value for each one channel being used to obtain
a wideband estimate of beat carrier phase for each one
channel, a number of accumulation mid point times, each
accumulation mid point time being an accumulation mid
point time for one channel, and a number of unit direction
vectors, each unit direction vector pointing from a GNSS
signal source for one channel; said spoofing detection
hypothesis test component configured to high pass filter
carrier phase measurements of received GNSS signals and
the articulation pattern, the high pass filtering resulting in
estimation of coefficients in an expression for the carrier
phase measurement residuals, determine a likelihood cost
function for a non-spoofed configuration, the likelihood cost
function being obtained from the ratio of probability density
functions, results of the high pass filtering being used in
determining said likelihood cost function, determine another
likelihood cost function for a spoofed configuration; a
spoofing detection hypothesis test statistic being a difference
of said another likelihood cost function minimum and said
likelihood cost function minimum, results of the high pass
filtering being used in determining the another likelihood
cost function, comparing the spoofing detection hypothesis
test statistic to a predetermined threshold, the GNSS signals
deemed to be spoofed if the spoofing detection hypothesis
test statistic is less than the predetermined threshold.
Section II describes an embodiment of the moving-an-
tenna spoofing detection system hardware architecture and
its data flows. Section III develops the carrier-phase signal
models that are used to derive spoofing detection hypothesis
tests. Sections IV-VI develop three different versions of the
spoofing detection hypothesis tests that apply for the case of
uni-axial antenna articulation motion. Section IV presents a
technique for the case of a known attitude of the articulations
relative to the GNSS reference frame. Section V presents a
technique for the case of unknown attitude. Section VI
presents a technique for the case of unknown attitude and an
unknown amplitude scaling factor. These sections also
develop the calculations needed to derive detection thresh-
olds as functions of false-alarm probabilities and to deter-
mine the resultant probabilities of missed detection. Section
VII addresses the issue of possible uncertainty in the time
phasing of the articulations. Section VIII discusses enhance-
ments that are needed for general 3D antenna motion.
Section IX presents tests of the new method, both on
truth-model data and on live-signal data. Section X dis-
cusses some characteristics of the new spoofing detection
method, and it makes further comparisons to IMU-based
detection methods. Section XI provides a summary of the
present teachings and presents conclusions.
II. System Architecture
A. Antenna Hardware and Geometry
The hardware and geometry for this spoofing detection
method are shown in FIGS. 1 and 2 for one possible version
of this system. FIG. 1 shows the system in a non-spoofed
scenario with 3 of the GNSS satellites whose signals are
being tracked, satellites j-1, j, and j+l. FIG. 2 shows the
same system in which a spoofer is sending false versions of
the signals from these same satellites. The spoofer has a
single transmission antenna. Satellite j-1, j, and j+1 may be
visible to the receiver antenna, but the spoofer has
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"hijacked" the receiver's tracking loops for these signals so
that only the false spoofed versions of these signals are
known to the receiver.
The receiver antenna of the potential spoofing victim is
5 mounted in a way that allows its phase center to move with
respect to its mounting base. In FIGS. 1 and 2, this motion
system is depicted as an open kinematic chain consisting of
three links with ball joints that allow 6-degree-of-freedom
motion. This is just one example of how a system can be
io configured in order to allow antenna motion relative to its
mounting base. It is normally not necessary to allow for full
6-degree-of-freedom motion. The system can work well
with just one translational degree of motion, such as a
piston-like up-and-down motion that could be provided by a
15 solenoid which operated along the za antenna articulation
axis.
Yet another possible configuration is to mount the antenna
on a cantilevered beam that points along the za axis and that
allows for single-degree-of-freedom vibratory motion along
20 the xa or ya axis, as shown in a photograph of the first
prototype system, FIG. 3. A string connects to the left-hand
side of the small metal ground plane below the patch
antenna. It is used to excite the articulation motions. The thin
beam extending below the antenna is cantilevered off of the
25 barrel in the lower right of the figure. The antenna articu-
lation motion is a 1-dimensional damped oscillation from
left to right across FIG. 3's field of view, as indicated by the
double-ended arrow. Although not present in the first pro-
totype system, it is desirable to include a sensing system that
30 measures the antenna motion. It would measure articulations
relative to the mounting base.
Let the articulation time history vector relative to the
(xa,ya,za) UE-fixed coordinate system be defined as
35
40
x (t)ba(r) = y,W
za (r)
M
If the articulation system is designed to give single-degree-
of-freedom motion along the known fixed unit direction
vector ba, then the full articulation vector can be written as
45 
ba(r)—pa(r)b, (2)
where pa(t) is the antenna phase center deflection time
history measured along the ba axis.
Note that the base of the antenna articulation system is
mounted directly to the UE. If the UE is statically mounted
50 on a building, as for a power grid monitor, a cell phone
tower, or a financial institution, then the (xa,ya,za) UE-fixed
coordinate system will also be Earth-fixed. It would be
possible to calibrate/survey this coordinate system so that
ba(t) could be known in Earth-fixed coordinates.
55 If the UE is mounted to a moving vehicle, such as an
airplane, a ship, or a wheeled vehicle, then (xa,ya,za) coor-
dinate system will translate and rotate in the general case. It
is assumed that the rotations and translations of this coor-
dinate system occur in a lower-frequency domain as com-
60 pared to the higher-frequency ba(t) antenna articulations. It
should be possible to articulate ba(t) at a frequency of 8-16
Hz or possibly even a bit higher. Therefore, the maximum
allowable frequency for significant UE rotational and trans-
lational motions is probably about 1-5 Hz, which is a
65 reasonable upper limit for many applications.
FIG. 1 includes the unit direction vectors from the GNSS
spacecraft to the UE. They are ?-i, ?, and ?+i for, respec-
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tively, the GNSS satellites j-1, j, and j+l. These vectors
point from the phase centers of the respective GNSS space-
craft antennas to the origin of the (xa,ya,z,) UE-fixed
coordinate system. It is assumed that these unit direction
vectors are known to the spoofing detection algorithm. In the 5
non-spoofed case, these vectors are typically computed as
part of the standard pseudorange-based navigation solution.
In the case of spoofing, the spoofed pseudoranges can be
used to compute a spoofed navigation solution and the
corresponding spoofed values of the unit direction vectors l0
?-', ?, and ?+'. Even though these vectors are typically
incorrect during a spoofing attack, perhaps wildly incorrect,
they will be used in the spoofing detection calculations as
though they were correct. Any believable spoofed scenario 15
will be precluded from using a false set of ?-i ? and ?+'
vectors that can deceive the spoofing detector's hypothesis
test, as will be demonstrated in Subsection X.B. Note: the
corresponding dimensional satellite-to-receiver vectors are
r'-', r', and r'+  in both the non-spoofed and spoofed cases. 20
The spoofed case in FIG. 2 replaces the presumed known
unit direction vectors ?-', ?, and ?+' with the unknown unit
direction vector ?P. This vector points from the spoofer's
transmission antenna to the UE. In the spoofed case, the
spoofing detector will, in effect, estimate one or more 25
components of ?P as measured in its (xa,ya,za) antenna
articulation coordinate system.
The method of these teachings relies on the assumption
that the spoofing signals come from a single spoofer trans-
mission antenna. A spoofer that used more than one trans- 30
mission antenna with significantly different FP vectors
would likely not be detectable using the present methods.
Enhanced versions of its methods would be needed. Fortu-
nately, successful implementation of a multi-transmitter
spoofing attack would be very difficult technically, and the 35
needed hardware would be much more costly than the
spoofer hardware used in present investigations (see, for
example, Humphreys, T. E., Ledvina, B. M., Psiaki, M. L.,
O'Hanlon, B., and Kintner, P. M., Jr., "Assessing the Spoof-
ing Threat: Development of a Portable GPS Civilian 40
Spoofer," Proc. ION GNSS 2008, Sept. 16-19, 2008, Savan-
nah, Ga. and in Humphreys, T. E., Kintner, P. M., Jr., Psiaki,
M. L., Ledvina, B. M., and O'Hanlon, B. W., "Assessing the
Spoofing Threat," GPS World, Vol. 20, No. 1, January 2009,
pp. 28-38). Much of the difficulty in mounting a multi- 45
transmitter spoofing attack lies in the need to precisely
phase-align the false RE signals from the different transmit-
ters.
It is important that the spoofer not know the antenna
articulation time history ba(t), at least not in a timely enough 50
manner to spoof the effects of this motion on the received
beat carrier-phase signals. One way to keep this knowledge
from the spoofer is to cover the entire antenna articulation
system with a radome. It must be opaque to visible light but
transparent to GNSS RE signals. The radome need not be 55
large because antenna articulation motions on the order of
4-6 cm peak-to-peak are typically sufficient for reliable
spoofing detection, and they can occur along a single axis.
Another possible method to avoid spoofing of the ba(t)
carrier-phase effects is to make the ba(t) motions be of too 60
high a frequency for the spoofer to sense and respond in a
timely manner. On a UAV, concealment of ba(t) can be
achieved by masking the location of the GNSS antenna. This
approach will be especially effective if the antenna is
mounted far away from the UAV center of mass and if the 65
ba(t) motions are caused by high-frequency dithering com-
mands to the UAV attitude.
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B. Signal Processing Hardware and Connectivity
Much of the spoofing detection signal processing is
carried out using standard GNSS receiver functions, as per
Misra, P., and Enge, P. Global Positioning System, Signals,
Measurements, and Performance, 2"d Ed, Ganga-Jamuna
Press, (Lincoln, Mass., 2006), pp. 467-498. FIG. 4 shows the
signal processing block diagram for an example receiver
channel and its relationship to the other elements of the
spoofing detection system. All except 6 blocks, the three
left-most blocks ("RE front-end 15", "Receiver clock 25",
and "Antenna articulation sensor 35"), the two right-most
blocks in the bottom row ("Mid-point sampler 45" and
"Spoofing detection hypothesis test 55"), and the top-right
block ("Navigation solution 65") are standard processing
blocks in a single tracking channel of a digital GNSS
receiver. A new function of each tracking channel is to
synthesize a special beat carrier-phase measurement for
input to the spoofing detection test. This is done using the
"Mid-point sampler 45" block just to the right of center at
the bottom of the figure and using the summation junction to
the right of this block. A receiver uses L such channels to
track L signals. It provides L carrier-phase time histories to
the "Spoofing detection hypothesis test 55" block in the
bottom right-hand corner of the figure.
The 3 blocks labeled "RE front-end 15", "Receiver clock
25", and "Navigation solution 65" are also standard blocks.
They are common to all receiver channels. They provide
inputs to or accept outputs from each channel.
The 2 blocks "Antenna articulation sensor 35" and
"Spoofing detection hypothesis test 55" are new blocks
needed for spoofing detection. They are also common to all
channels.
The RE signal from the patch antenna on the left-hand
side of the figure first passes through an RE front-end. This
RE front-end mixes the signal so that the nominal carrier
frequency is down-translated to the intermediate frequency
(IF) w, ,. The RE front-end uses an ADC to digitally sample
this IF signal, and sends the result into the receiver's
high-sample-rate digital signal processing hardware. The
signal first gets mixed to baseband, both in-phase and
quadrature, as it moves from left to right across the center of
the figure. Next, the signal is mixed with the prompt replica
of the pseudo random number (PRN) code that is particular
to the satellite being tracked. The base-band mixing signal is
provided by the Phase-Lock Loop (PLL) feedback in the
lower central portion of the figure. Its estimate of the carrier
Doppler shift for the k h accumulation interval is w,iik. The
prompt PRN code replica is provided by the Delay-Lock
Loop (DLL) feedback in the upper central portion of the
figure. Its estimate of the PRN code's Doppler-shifted
chipping rate is f y Pk. These two tracking loops rely on the
prompt in-phase and quadrature accumulations, IPk and QPk
for the k h accumulation interval, which are computed by the
accumulate-and-dump registers just to the right of the fig-
ure's center. The DLL discriminator also uses in-phase and
prompt early-minus-late accumulations Iem,k and Qem,k or
related accumulations, but the signal processing paths for
computing these standard accumulations is omitted from the
figure.
The following quantities are the important outputs of the
standard signal tracking hardware part of FIG. 4: The PLL
(negative) beat carrier phase time history ~ ..(t), the mid-
point time of the k h accumulation interval time-0.5(ti~k+
ti,k+,), and the PLL phase error discriminator value for this
interval A~ ..k. The beat carrier phase is termed "negative"
because it has the opposite sign of the usual beat carrier
phase definition in the GPS literature. It equals the time
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integral of the received carrier Doppler shift, and it increase
as the range from the GNSS satellite to the receiver
decreases. Note that the start and stop times for the k h
accumulation interval are ti,k and T,,,,, as dictated by the
DLL.
The summation junction in the lower right-hand corner of
FIG. 4 synthesizes the following wideband estimate of the
(negative) beat carrier phase at the accumulation interval's
mid-point:
(Pk-<PPLL(Zmidk)-A~,Lk (3)
This modified carrier-phase observable differs in two sig-
nificant respects from the standard beat carrier phase mea-
surement produced by most receivers, that is, from PLL
(imidk). First, the measurement noise samples for different
accumulation periods are white rather than colored. Second,
~k does not attenuate the effects of high-frequency compo-
nents of ba(t) that lie outside the PLL bandwidth; ~pLL(T_idk)
includes only attenuated versions of these components.
These distinctives of the ~k observable are important to the
proper functioning of the spoofing detection tests. Note,
however, that the noise power in ~k is larger than in PLL
(imidk). This drawback is insignificant in comparison to the
advantage of having a wide-band beat carrier phase mea-
surement corrupted by white noise rather than colored noise.
Note that some receivers may use slightly different signal
processing strategies that could impact the needed summa-
tion in Eq. (3). In particular, the -A~pLL, term on the
right-hand side of Eq. (3) must be replaced by +A~pLL, in
some cases in order to properly form the wideband (nega-
tive) beat carrier phase. This will be the case if the RE
front-end uses high-side mixing while the receiver uses the
absolute value of the resulting intermediate frequency as its
wrf,. Alternatively, a negation of the quadrature baseband
mixing signal used to form QPk would create the need for this
same sign change in the ~k formula.
The spoofing detection block in the bottom right-hand
corner of FIG. 4 takes four types of inputs: the antenna
articulation time history ba(t), the accumulation mid-point
time T_idk for each tracking channel, the wideband (nega-
tive) beat carrier phase ~k for each tracking channel, and the
unit direction vector that points from each tracked GNSS
satellite r. Suppose that there are L tracked GNSS satellites
labeled j=1, ... , L. Suppose, also, that for satellite j the
spoofing detection test uses data from Nj accumulations.
Then the spoofing detection receiver must implement L
parallel DLL/PLL/wideband-beat-carrier-phase signal pro-
cessing channels as per FIG. 4. The resulting outputs of
these L channels that will be used in the spoofing detection
block will be T_id i and ~k for k=1, ... , Nj and j=1, ... ,
L. Also used will be ba(imidk) for k=1, . . . , Nj and
j=1, ... , L along with ? for j=1, ... , L. This set of inputs
implies that the spoofing detection interval is short enough
to approximate each unit direction vector ? as being con-
stant.
In the results presented herein below, the GNSS receiver
is a "software" receiver. In embodiments of the system of
these teachings, components can be implemented as dedi-
cated hardware, dedicated circuits, or software being
executed by a processor. A component being configured for,
as used herein, refers to either dedicated hardware design to
perform specified functions or to computer usable media
having computer readable code embodied therein, which
when executed by a processor, cause of the processor to
perform the specified functions. FIG. 4a shows the latter
configuration. Referring to FIG. 4a, computer usable media
120 has computer readable code embodied therein that,
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when executed in one or more processors 110, causes the
processor to perform functions in the method of these
teachings. The computer usable media 120 is operatively
connected to the one or more processors 110 through a
5 computer interconnection component 115 (such as a com-
puter bus). An input interface 125 is also operatively con-
nected to the one or more processors 110 and to the
computer usable media 120 in order to allow for input
io 
necessary for performing the desired functions.
The calculations implemented in the spoofing detection
block are the subject of Sections III-VIII.
III. Carrier Phase Model for Spoofing Detection
Two models of the negative beat carrier phase observablei5 
~ i are needed in order to do spoofing detection. The first
model covers the non-spoofed case, and the second model
covers the spoofed case.
A. Non-Spoofed Carrier Phase Model and Cycle-Slip
20 Repair
The non-spoofed carrier phase model starts with a stan-
dard model from the GPS literature
25
Ok - - ["k 
+'9k ba(rmidk)]T [Yk +'9k ba(rmidk
)] 
- 
(4)
~c(6tRk - 6tk - " nI + `t,,k) + Yj + njOk
30
where X is the carrier wavelength, w, is the nominal carrier
frequency in rad/sec (=27tc/X, with c being the speed of
light), Ak is the 3-by-3 direction cosines matrix for the
35 transformation from the reference coordinate system in
which the rk vector is known to the (xa,ya,z,) UE-fixed
coordinate system in which ba(t) is known, StRk is the
receiver clock error, Stk is the transmitter clock error for
4o 
satellite j, Ti_ i is the ionospheric phase advance term,
ti Pok is the neutral atmosphere delay term, IV is the carrier
phase bias, and N.' is the random component of the carrier
phase noise. The leading negative sign on the right-hand side
of Eq. (4) is what makes ~ i negative beat carrier phase
45 rather than a standard beat carrier phase. The k subscripts on
rk, Ak, BtRk, Stk, Tionok, tit Pok, and n,,,'indicate that they all
vary with the time of applicability'rm,dkj. Note that w, equals
2711575.42x106 rad/sec for the GPS LI signal.
50 The carrier phase bias term IV contains both the integer-
ambiguity component and the lesser-known fractional cycle
component. It does not have a k subscript because it will be
constant in a well-designed receiver. In the current applica-
55 tion, however, an insufficient PLL bandwidth coupled with
a higher bandwidth antenna motion ba(t) can give rise to
half- or full-cycle slips that violate this constancy assump-
tion.
60 Therefore, it may be necessary to do some extra process-
ing to a given ~ j vs. tim,ak beat carrier phase time history for
k=1, .. Nj in order to remove cycle slips and thereby
ensure the required constancy of the bias. This amounts to a
phase unwrapping operation. The needed operation starts
65 with a detrending of ~k vs. T_i i, perhaps by subtracting a
linear or quadratic fit of this curve from ~k. Suppose that this
detrended phase time history is 6~ / VS. '1midk
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The following pseudocode performs the necessary phase
unwrapping in the case of half-cycle ambiguities:
1. Initialize the first sample of the unwrapping increment
time history: 6~,_ 0 for k=l.
2. Initialize k=2.
3.
1
Set 60' k = 7r round 1 (60drk-1 + 60J."-1 — 6'hark )~
4. Replace 
~j by ~j+6~, i.
5. Replace k by k+l.
6. If k-Nj go to Step 2; otherwise, stop.
The round( ) function is the standard function that rounds its
argument to the nearest integer.
If the tracked channel is a dataless pilot channel, such as
the CL code on the GPS L2 signal, then any carrier-phase
slips will be full cycles rather than half cycles. In this case,
the 2-quadrant atan(QPk/IPk) phase discriminator in FIG. 4
should be replaced with the 4-quadrant atan2(Qpk,Ipk) dis-
criminator, and the two a terms in Step 3 of the above
pseudocode should be replaced by 271 terms.
The magnitude of ba(t) is typically much smaller than the
magnitude r/ in Eq. (4), centimeters vs. 20,000 km. There-
fore, the following approximation of Eq. (4) to first-order in
ba is sufficiently accurate:
IT 
~k - — ~ (>k) 'j + (~)T Ak bo(rmidk )~ — (5)
&)c (6tRk — 64' — T owk + 'jtropok) +Y'i + nek
An additional approximation is reasonable, that of a
constant ?. The actual variations of elements of the Yki unit
direction vector from their mean values over a typical
spoofing detection interval of 0.5 see or less are on the order
of 6xI0-5 even for a supersonic aircraft traveling at Mach 3
in the opposite direction of GNSS Satellite j's ground track.
The components of ba(t) typically are on the order of 10 cm
or less. Therefore, Yki can be approximated by the constant ?
value that equals the 
i1i 
vector which applies at the mid-point
of a given spoofing detection interval. Thus, the new
approximate (negative) beat carrier phase equation
becomes:
@k =-T ~ ( k)T k +(r""')TAkbo(,J.idk)]-
&)c (6tRk — 64' — T owk + 'jtropok) +Y'i + nek
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This approximation leads to the following non-spoofed
carrier phase model
5 Ok TW)'Ak ba(rmidk)+90+ 
(g)
pp 1 pl 2
Yi(~idk — ~idl)+ Y2(~idk — ~idl) +nOk
10 
Yet another simplification approximates the coordinate
transformation matrix Ak as being constant over the spoofing
detection interval. This leads to a dropping of its k subscript
so that the carrier phase model becomes:
15
@'k= —~( )rArbo(T'idk)+ go, + 
(9)
91'
1 2
(Tmidk — ~id1)+ Z16'2(Tmidk —~idl) 
+ "j
20
One last simplification of the carrier-phase model can be
made in the special case of uni-axial motion in ba(t), as
defined in Eq. (2). This takes place along the known unit
25 vector direction ba in antenna articulation coordinates and
along the typically unknown vector direction ra ATba in
reference coordinates. The beat carrier-phase model in this
case becomes:
30
Oi 27r 
k - — +YO + 
(10)
P
1 p 2
Yl(Tidk—~idl)+,Z—Y2(Tidk—~idl) +n~k
35
with the antenna deflection amplitude time history pa(t)
known.
Carrier Phase Noise Model. The carrier phase noise term
4o n,,k' is modeled as being Gaussian white noise. Its statistics
are
E{nek} = 0 and (11)
45
— ( 
0 ifk#1 
(o-')2 if k='  lE{nOknOi} Sl with
1
(6) 50 2(C/No)'Or` g
Another simplification uses a quadratic polynomial in
time in order to approximate all of the terms other than the
(?)TAkTba(T_, i spoofing detection term and the n.,k' noise
term. This involves the following approximation for the
low-frequency behavior of the (negative) beat carrier phase:
(~i.)=—~ (k) k 
—
~c(6rRk —6ik
— wk +rtropok)+~'- (7)~df 
#'0 
pp 1 l 2
YO+A('Jidk —~;dl)+ ~
p 
2(rmidk — ~idl)
where Po' ,Ri , and P2 are constant polynomial coefficients.
where (C/Noy is the carrier-to-noise ratio of the received
signal for GNSS Satellite j in absolute Hz units and where
AT,, g=mean(T,,+1-ti,,) is the average accumulation inter-
55 val in the Satellite j tracking system, as depicted in FIG. 4,
given in seconds. The units of (' in Eq. (11) are radians. Note
that the phase noise terms for different GNSS satellites are
assumed to be uncorrelated.
B. Spoofed Carrier Phase Model
60 The spoofed carrier phase model starts with a modified
version of Eq. (4) that includes both the effects of the
spoofer's signal design and the relative geometry between
the spoofer and the intended victim. The spoofer is assumed
to know the relative geometry between it and the origin of
65 the (xa,ya,z,) UE-fixed coordinate system. It is assumed not
to know the ba(t) antenna articulation motions. As per the
attack mode described, for example, in Humphreys. T. E.,
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Ledvina, B. M., Psiaki, M. L., O'Hanlon, B., and Kintner, P.
M., Jr., "Assessing the Spoofing Threat: Development of a
Portable GPS Civilian Spoofer," Proc. ION GNSS 2008,
Sept. 16-19, 2008, Savannah, Ga. and in Humphreys, T. E.,
Kintner, P. M., Jr., Psiaki, M. L., Ledvina, B. M., and
O'Hanlon, B. W., "Assessing the Spoofing Threat," GPS
World, Vol. 20, No. 1, January 2009, pp. 28-38, the spoofer
is presumed to have compensated for the known part of the
relative geometry so that the signal looks to the victim like
a real GNSS signal.
The spoofed beat carrier phase model that corresponds to
this type of attack is
@'k =- {~(rk)T~ - (r v)Tr° + (12)
[rk"
 + Ak bo (Tmidk )]T [r~ + Ak ba (Tmidk )] } —W
, (6tRk + 6tR,,,k 
— 
6tk 
— Took +T 't opok) + fl' + "Ok
The first two terms in the braced expression on the
right-hand side of Eq. (12) are generated by the spoofer as
part of its false signal. The third term in that expression is the
term due to the geometry of the spoofer/victim relative
antenna location. The spoofer synthesizes the second of its
terms with the goal of canceling the effects of the third term.
Were it not for the ba(t) antenna articulations, this cancel-
lation would be perfect.
The spoofer also synthesizes the terms 6t,P,, 6t j, trio ok,
and tit Pok in Eq. (12). These terms represent, respectively,
the spoofed increment to the victim receiver clock error, the
spoofed GNSS satellite clock error, the spoofed ionospheric
carrier phase advance, and the spoofed ionospheric delay.
After a set of approximations similar to those used to go
from Eq. (4) to Eqs. (6), (8), and (9) for the non-spoofed
case, a reasonable approximation of the spoofed carrier-
phase model in Eq. (12) takes the form:
@'k --~(pp)TATba(T,'n;e)+/30+ (13)
A
1 
~ 
idk 
/ 2
(Tmidk — Tmidl)+ 2/'2(Tm —Tmidl) +- Ok
This chain of approximations includes a linearization in
terms of ba(t) of the nonlinear 3rd term on the right-hand side
of Eq. (12). This linearization is reasonable because the
magnitude of ba(t) is normally much smaller than the
magnitude of rk P, less than 10 cm vs. 10 s of meters or more.
The approximation also involves replacing the time-varying
unit-direction vector rk P with the constant mid-point direc-
tion i'P. This approximation is reasonable because a spoofer
typically maintains a relative geometry to the victim that
does not vary very rapidly with time; otherwise, it might
have trouble spoofing the victim. If either of these approxi-
mations were to break down, either because the spoofer was
very close to the victim or because it changed geometry very
rapidly, then Eq. (13) should and could be modified appro-
priately.
The approximation in Eq. (13) involves a modified low-
frequency polynomial approximation for the non-articula-
tion terms in the beat carrier phase model of Eq. (12). This
approximation takes the form
16
, T r' 
T
r' — w, 6t + 6t 6t' r ono +, + 
(14)
Oif ( midk) — ~ ~ k) k ~ Rk Rspk — k — k tropok)
pp pp 
~/ 1 p 2
5 YJ - YO + Nl (~ idk — Tmidl ) + 2 /'2 (~ idk — Tmid 1)
with Ro , (31', and P21 again being constant polynomial
coefficients. The only differences between this low-fre-
l0 quency approximation and that of Eq. (7) are the presence of
the spoofed receiver clock error increment 6t,Pk and the fact
that most of the terms in this model are spoofed quantities
rather than true quantities.
The salient feature of the spoofed carrier phase model in
15 Eq. (13) is the first term on its right-hand side. In comparing
this model to the non-spoofed model in Eq. (9), a single
difference stands out: The non-spoofed satellite-to-receiver
direction vector ? in Eq. (9) is replaced by the spoofer-to-
receiver direction vector ?P. The most important aspect of
20 this replacement is that this direction is the same for all
satellites j=1, ... , L for the spoofed case, but different for
the non-spoofed case. This fact implies that all signals' beat
carrier phase time histories, ~k vs. T_jdk for k=1, ... , Nj and
j=1, ... , L will display identical ba(t) effects in the spoofed
25 case but different ba(I) effects in the non-spoofed case. This
is a principal upon which the present teachings' spoofing
detection tests are based.
Similar to the non-spoofed case, a modified form of Eq.
30 (13) can be developed for the special case of rectilinear
antenna articulation motion, as defined in Eq. (2). It takes the
form
35 Ok = — 7 
(pp)%P,(Tmidk)+go, + (15)
pp 
1 p 2
YO(.idk—Tmidl)+,2—Y2(.idk—Tmidl) +nok
4o Recall that ra A'ba is the articulation unit direction vector
in reference coordinates and that pa(t) is the articulation
magnitude. The former quantity is often unknown, but the
latter is usually known exactly.
IV. Spoofing Detection Hypothesis Tests With Uni-Axial
45 Antenna Articulations and known Attitude
A. Restriction to Uni-axial Antenna Articulations
The spoofing detection test and analyses of the present
section and of Sections V and VI deal with the special case
of uni-axial antenna articulation motion as defined in the
5o antenna coordinate system, i.e., as in Eq. (2). Therefore, Eq.
(10) models the beat carrier phase in the non-spoofed case,
and Eq. (15) is the spoofed-case model. This restriction to
uni-axial motion is not necessary to the method. It is adopted
here for two reasons: First, it simplifies the resulting spoof-
55 ing detection statistic calculations and the analyses of their
false-alarm and missed-detection probabilities. Second, it
simplifies the design of the articulation hardware. Section
VIII outlines methods to modify the detection statistic
calculations and the corresponding probability analyses for
6o a general 3-dimensional ba(t) antenna articulation time his-
tory.
B. High-Pass Filtering via Linear Least-Squares Estimation
High-pass filtering of the carrier-phase measurements can
be used to remove the low-frequency effects of unknown UE
65 motion and unknown UE receiver clock drift. This high-pass
filtering amounts to least-squares estimation of the unknown
polynomial coefficients Poi, R i , and P2 j in Eq. (10) or Eq.
US 9,958,549 B2
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(15). The same calculations can be used to isolate the
uni-axial antenna motion effects into a single equation per z', 011 (1g)
GNSS signal.
z2 02
j.
The needed filtering calculations for the jth GNSS signal
z3 @35
start with the following over-determined system of linear
1
z3 
_ 
~j (Qj) z, and
equations
ZNj Nj
27r (16) 10
@1
APa(~idl)
@2 1 (Tmid2 — Tmidl) .2—(Tmid2 — Tmidl )2 — ~Pa(~id2)
J
nj 
n01
~3 
— 1 (Tmid3 — Tmidl) .2—(Tmid3 — Tmidl)2 — A Pa(Tid3)
n2
773 1 
nit
15 . — 
_j (QJ)T n03n
4
ONj
1 (TmidNj — Tmidl)
1 2 ,2
.2—(TmidNj — Tmidl) — Pa("idNj) nJ
nJ ~NJNJ
20
njo1 The orthogonal nature of Q' and the IV normalization
go, 
n02 factor cause the transformed, normalized Gaussian noise
/3J, vector [ni ; ... ; nr,'] to have an identity covariance matrix.j
~. + n03 Note that this vector has a mean of zero.
25 The important output of these high-pass filtering opera-
(`) nj tions is a single equation for each GNSS signal that contains
~N' all the information about whether or not it has been spoofed.
This equation is the 4t'' scalar equation in the transformed,
normalized version of E (16) It takes the form:
This same set of equations is repeated once for each satellite 30 
q
j=1, ... , L. In the non-spoofed case, the unit direction vector zd-R41e. Aa]+nd (19)ix in Eq. (16) is ?, but it equals ?P in the spoofed case.
The high-pass filter works by computing the orthogonal/ where n4 is "zero-mean, unit-variance in 
Gaussian random
scalar. The is through 3'' equations the transformed
upper-triangular (QR) factorization of a normalized version 
system do not affect any of the spoofing detection tests
of the Nj-by-4 coefficient matrix on the right-hand side of 35 because their effects can be integrated out of any standard
Eq. (16). This factorization takes the form: Neyman-Pearson test under the diffuse prior assumption
about the polynomial coefficients Ro , (3 '1, and (3z . The
resulting integrals are identical under the non-spoofed and
Ri1 Rig Ri3 Rio (17) 40 spoofed hypotheses. Equations 5 through Nj are identical
0 R22 R'23 R24 under the non-spoofed and spoofed hypothesis. Therefore,
0 0 Rj Rj neither do they contribute to the optimal Neyman-PearsonQ; 4 
- detection statistic. They serve only to isolate the residual
0 0 0 R44 error terms zs , . . zr,'. The data in Eq. (19) for
0 0 0 0 45 j=1, ... , L will form the basis for the spoofing detection tests
of this section and of Sections V and VI.
C. Spoofing Detection Hypothesis Test for Fixed-Base UE
with Known Attitude
27r The optimal Neyman-Pearson test statistic is based on the
1 0 0 
— pl('idl)
~ ratio of the probability densities of the carrier-phase data1 
2 211 
So 
given the two hypotheses, the Ho hypothesis of no spoofing
1 (Tmid2 -Tmidl) 2(Tmid2 -Tmidl) - T Pa(Tmid2) and the H, hypothesis of spoofing. Stated in terms of the
1 1 z 2n high-pass-filtered result in Eq. (19), the two relevant prob-
O_j 1 (T.id3 -Tmidl) 2(Tmid3 -Tm;m) - 
~ 
Pa(T,'nid3) 
ability densities are:
55
1 (TmidNj — Tmidl) .2-(TmidlVj — Tmidl)2 —AP,(Tmi.j) 1 c 
T 
2 (20a)
P(4, ... , z4 Ho) =wexp 2~ iRJ4I(rJ) ra]-  - ~
=1
The Nj-by-Nj orthonormal matrix q and the R11j, R12 , 
1 
L 
YJ 
(lob)
R13 , R44 elements of the corresponding upper- 
60 
p( , ... , z4  `I P", y1) - wexp - 
, 
{R44 [( )T ra] - z,'
triangular matrix are computed as the QR factorization 2 j=1
algorithm's outputs, and the matrix on the right-hand side of
Eq. (17) is the input In the fixed-location case with a known attitude, ra is
The high-pass filter operations also compute the trans- 65 known as are rlthrough ?L.  The dot product quantity (i P)Tra
formed, normalized beat carrier phase time history, and they is the only unknown quantity. In an optimal detection test,
are used to define the corresponding noise time history: this unknown quantity would be integrated out of the
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probability density expression in Eq. (20b). A simpler sub-
optimal approach, however, is to use the value of (?P) ra,
that maximizes the probability density in Eq. (20b), i.e., to
use the maximum-likelihood estimate of (i P)Tra under the
spoofed assumption. This maximum-likelihood estimate
also minimizes the negative natural logarithm of the spoofed
likelihood function. If this unknown dot product is defined
to be rl=(i P)Tra, then the negative-log-likelihood cost func-
tion for estimating it is:
1 ~ (21)j"(17) 
 
_ 
-ln[P(z4, ... , z4 p °, H1)] + In[w] + 2 E (8441- z4
)z
J=1
Note that this cost definition cancels the constant negative
natural logarithm of the normalizing probability density
constant w without affecting any subsequent results.
The optimal value of this dot product under the spoofing
assumption can be computed by first solving for its uncon-
strained minimizing value. Standard linear least-squares
techniques yield:
L (22)
J
R44z4
j=1
L
z
(R44)
j=1
Afterwards, the constraints are enforced to produce
the final solution:
-1 if 77,t <-1 (23)
7 ,t if -1 < 77,t < t
1 if 1 < 7 ,t
This constraint arises from the fact that the rl dot product is
defined between two unit direction vectors.
Given the dot product estimate in Eq. (23), the associated
spoofing detection statistic can be defined in terms of the
difference between the negative logarithms of the spoofed
and non-spoofed probability density functions in, respec-
tively, Eqs. (20b) and (20a). The former quantity is 7P(rlPt).
The latter quantity is
J,= —ln[P(4, ... , Ho)] + In[w] = 2 Y,{Ran ~( )T pa~ — z4}
z
j=1
This latter quantity is defined using the cost-function-like
notation "J" even though it contains no unknown quantities
that need to be determined via maximum-likelihood opti-
mization. This notation has been adopted because spoofing
detection tests for later cases will involve unknown quanti-
ties for the non-spoofed Ho hypothesis in addition to the 
I 2
unknown dot product rl for the spoofed H, hypothesis. ~ (Rj )2~(pj)Tq44
Given these values, the spoofing detection hypothesis test 2 T_ 2 1 j=1
statistic is _,,,~" = E {Rj4 [( ) ra]} - 2 T
-1 
E (R44)2(25)
65 J=1y JP(11 Pt)—J on P
The corresponding spoofing detection test takes the form:
Accept the non-spoofed hypothesis Ho if y>_y,; otherwise,
20
accept the spoofed hypothesis Hl. The quantity y, is the
detection threshold. Its value is determined based on a
desired false-alarm probability, as described in the next
subsection. Under the reasonable assumption that the use of
5 i1 Pt in p(z41, . . . , z4LIi'sP,H,) yields nearly the same
detection performance as would integration of the rl uncer-
tainty out of p(z41, .. , z4LIFPH,), this detection test is
nearly optimal. This is true because there is a monotonic
relationship between y and the optimal hypothesis test ratio
10 p(z41 ... , z4LIHo)/p(z41, ... , z4LIi'P,H1)•
Before conducting a rigorous analysis, it is worthwhile to
note that this detection test makes sense intuitively. If the
signals from GNSS satellites j=1, .. L are not being
spoofed, then the non-spoofed carrier-phase model in Eq.
15 (10) should fit the data well. The corresponding weighted
sum of squared residual errors, 7 o P in Eq. (24), should be
small. The spoofed carrier-phase model in Eq. (15), how-
ever, should not fit the data well, and the associated opti-
mized weighted sum of squared residuals, 7P(g pt), should
20 be large. Therefore, Eq. (25) should produce a large, positive
value of the spoofing detection statistic y. This value will
exceed any reasonable choice of y,, and the lack of spoofing
will be correctly identified. In the case of spoofing, however,
it is 7nonP that should be large due to the poor fit of the
non-spoofed model in Eq. (10), and 7P(,q Pt) should be small25 due to the good fit of the spoofed model in Eq. (15). The
resulting y from Eq. (25) will likely be negative and lie
below any reasonable y, threshold value. The threshold test
will successfully detect a spoofing attack in this case.
D. Approximation of Non-Spoofed and Spoofed Probability
so 
Density Functions of Spoofing Detection Statistic
Design of the spoofing detection threshold and analysis of
the detection power starts with derivation of two probability
density functions. One is the probability density function for
35 the detection statistic y under the non-spoofed hypothesis,
p(y I Ho). The other is the y probability density function under
the spoofed hypothesis, p(yl qH,). The random variability of
y which gives rise to its probability density function in each
of these cases derives from the detection statistic's depen-
40
dence on the zero-mean, identity-covariance L-by-I Gauss-
ian random vector v=[n41; n42; nos; ; n4L]
Analysis of the non-spoofed density function p(ylHo)
yields the result that y can be expressed as the sum of two
uncorrelated random terms:
45
1 (26)
Y=-2A1+Y--p
50 where x12 is a sample from a chi-squared distribution of
degree 1 and where ynonP is a Gaussian random variable
with mean and variance:
55 L ~ (27a)
~E (R44)2 [(YJ)TYa]~
1 L R p~ Tpp 
2 1 j=1
j-1 Y(R44)2
j=1
60
(27b)
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The derivation that leads to Eqs. (26)-(27a) is based on an
analysis of the ways in which JP and J o P depend on v and
on (r1) ra, .. , (i~) ra, in the non-spoofed case. It assumes
that the optimal estimate rl Pt from Eq. (23) is based on the
middle condition. This is the typical situation, and the
expected errors from this assumption are small when the first
or third conditions of Eq. (23) apply. Therefore, this is a
reasonable simplifying assumption. This simplifying
assumption is used in the analysis of every test statistic that
is developed in the present teachings.
An additional feature of the analysis leading to Eqs.
(26)-(27a) involves a special transformation of the Gaussian
random vector v. It is transformed orthogonally into a new
vector whose first component is parall
(ell 
to the unit-norm
vector gR44 [R441; . . . ; R44L
]
IV(R441)2+...,(R44L)2.
The remaining (L-1) components are orthogonal to this
vector. The first component of this transformed random
vector gives rise to the x12 term in Eq. (26), and the last
(L-1) components give rise to the randomness in the Gauss-
ian term y o P.
One final approximation leads to a model of p(ylHo). This
approximation assumes that the randomness in ynonP domi-
nates the randomness in x12 in determining the variability of
y for the non-spoofed case. This is reasonable because the
variance Cy7_ 
P2 is typically much larger than the variance
of the term
1 2
—ZX1,
which equals 0.5. This approximation leads to
1 _ 1 OS (2g)
P(Y I Ho) = N[Y; 2 
+,Y_,), 
  (2 +non,,) ] _
where N(x;x,ax) denotes the usual scalar Gaussian distribu-
tion:
N(x; X 1 e-(_-_)2/(2-,2) (29)
VIT"
OW
where x"12 is a sample from a non-central chi-squared
distribution of degree 1 and where yP is a Gaussian random
variable. These two random quantities are uncorrelated. The
non-centrality parameter of x"12 is
5
1 L z (32)
__ 
~=1
10 L
E(R'4)z
j=1
15 so that Z", 2  is the square of the sum of a zero-mean,
unit-variance Gaussian random variable and the constant
The mean and variance of yP are
20 L lIIj2 (33a)
~E (R44)2 [17 — (Yj)T q
l L T z 1 j=1
j_ E (R44)z
j=1
25
L 2 (33b)
L
I 
, (Ra4)~[7-(~)T"ra~~
c~ - .j "j T- z j-1ysp —
~{ 44[17
j=1
30
L
Y, (R44)2
j=1
The analysis that yields Eqs. (31)-(33b) involves the same
orthonormal transformation as was used in the non-spoofed
35 case, the one that transforms the Gaussian random vector v
into a first component parallel to the unit direction vector
g144 and the remaining (L-1) components perpendicular to
it.
40 The final form of p(yl q,H1) approximates the randomness
in the spoofed version of y as being dominated by the
Gaussian term yP, similar to the approximation used in the
non-spoofed case. Again, This is reasonable because the
variance ay P2 is typically much larger than the variance of
45
1~ p
2X'21,
and where the mean and standard deviation of the non- 50
spoofed detection statistic are which equals 0.5+7v,,,. The resulting p(ylq,H1) approxima-
tion is the Gaussian:
1 (30a)
'Y"  =- 2 +Y'_  1 1 1 os (34)55 P(YIq,H1)- 
LL
N~Y;~-2-- 
_'+Y"),~2+h"+~y~~ ~_
1 (30b) 
rya p= 2
+may o,,,, N[Y;Y,p(q),-yv(q)7
An analysis of the spoofed density function p(ylq,H1) 60 and where the mean and standard deviation of the non-
yields the following expression for y: spoofed detection statistic are
L 35a1 ~2 (31) 1 1 1 1 j j T 2 ( )Y=-2X,21+Y~ 65 Y,P(77)=-2-ZA +Y,P =-2-2~{R44[1/-(Y)pj
j=1
23
-continued
~yPC1)= 2+dnc+
0-
ysp = 2+~{R44[P-
( )T
q1
z
j=1
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-continued
(35b) c1 _
Cyspwc 
- 2 +E 
/ iR~4[
,Jwc - (~)
T 
q1
z
j=1
E. Design of Spoofing Detection Threshold and Analysis
of Detection Probability
Given the approximation of p(ylHo), the spoofing detec-
tion threshold y, can be computed as a function of the
desired false-alarm probability a. It is determined by solving
the following implicit equation for y,:
a 
=fllhp(y f1o) dY = 1 J }h e y-y p)zl(Hymn P) dY (36)
~~ynonsp
Standard software functions exist that can solve this equa-
tion for y,, e.g., MATLAB,s "norminv" function.
Given the spoofing detection threshold y, and the spoofed
probability density function approximation p(ylq,H1), the
probability of a missed spoofing detection can be calculated
as follows:
1 -[y-7 (,)]z/[2,y,P(,1)] d 
(37)
yth s "" ~YsP yth
Again, standard software functions, such as MATLAB,s
"normedf" function, can be used to compute this probability.
Note how the spoofed mean and standard deviation, Y'01)
of Eq. (35a) and ayP(q) of Eq. (35b), both depend on the
actual spoofed value of the vector dot product Tl=(?P)'ra.
This value is never actually known. One could use its
estimate from Eq. (23) in order to carry out the calculations
in Eqs. (35a), (35b), and (37). Alternatively, one could
postulate an a priori distribution for 'q and integrate out the
dependence of PmD on this unknown quantity. A preferred
approach, however, is to use its worst-case value to compute
a worst-case PmD. This value, designated as raw,, is the value
that maximizes PmD as computed using Eqs. (35a), (35b),
and (37). In typical situations, q_, is the '1 value that
maximizes yP(q) in Eq. (35a). This value is
L (38)
Y, (R44)z[(r')T
r°]
j=1
~w = L
Y, (R 
)2
j=1
This is the value which minimizes the sum on the extreme
right-hand side of Eq. (35a). This maximization of yP(q)
tends to push more of the area under the p(ylq,H1) vs. y
curve above the detection threshold y,, thereby increasing
PmD. Given this worst-case value, it can be used to define the
worst-case mean and standard deviation of y under the
spoofed assumption along with the worst-case probability of
missed detection:
( a)
Y-= - 2 - 2 
Y,
 
{R44 
~q_ - ( )T ra~~z
j=1
5
(39b)
PMDwc = 1 e (y-7"_) /(
2-zyspwc) dY (39c)
• ""' 07sPw f1h
10 V. Spoofing Detection Hypothesis Test for Moving-Base
UE with Unknown Attitude
The spoofing detection test of the previous section can be
adapted to the situation of an unknown receiver attitude by
explicitly considering the possible orientations of the
15 unknown articulation direction vector ra. In the spoofed
case, the lack of a priori knowledge of ra, adds no further
complication because the lack of knowledge of the direction
to the spoofer, ?P, renders the dot product Tl=(isP) ra
unknown regardless of whether ra is known or not. In the
20 unspoofed case, however, lack of knowledge of ra has a
significant impact.
A. Spoofing Detection Hypothesis Test, Unknown Atti-
tude
The optimal Neyman-Pearson spoofing detection test
25 would multiply p(z411 ... , z4LIra,Ho) from Eq. (20a) by an
a priori probability distribution for ra and compute the
integral over all possible unit-normalized ra values. A more
practical approach, however, is to compute the maximum-
likelihood estimate of ra and to use it in p(z41
30 z4LIra,Ho). The maximum-likelihood estimate is the solution
to the following minimization problem:
find: is
to minimize:
35
(40a)
1 c 
T z 
(40b)
7non,P(ra) = 2 Y,{R44[O r°~ 
-z4}
j=1
40
subject to: (Aa)Tr^a 1 (40c)
This takes the form of a quadratically-constrained quadratic
45 program. Its minimization of 7 o P(ra) is the equivalent of
maximizing p(z411 . . . , z4LIra,Ho) because the former
function equals a constant plus the negative natural loga-
rithm of the latter.
The constrained optimal estimation problem in Eqs.
50 (40a)-(40c) can be solved using a singular value decompo-
sition coupled with a Lagrange-multiplier/constraint calcu-
lation. The computation begins with the singular value
decomposition
55
~a 0 0 1 (Y1)T
R44
(41)
0 0-b 0 z zT
R44("r )
U VT =B 
= R3 (F3)T0 0 0
60
0 0 0 R44 (r )T
where U is an L-by-L orthonormal matrix, V is a 3-by-3
65 orthonormal matrix, and aa>_ab>_a,>_0 are the three non-
negative singular values, in decreasing order, of the L-by-3
matrix B that is defined by the expression on the extreme
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right-hand side of Eq. (41). The B matrix is the input to the
singular-value matrix factorization calculations, and U, V,
aa, ab, and a, are its outputs. Note that the singular values
aa, ab, and a, do not represent standard deviations.
Next, the U matrix is used to transform the non-homo-
geneous terms from the squared-error cost function in Eq.
(40b):
41 (42)
IZi
Zb UT
ZI
Zr
Z4
where za, zb, and z, are scalars and z,, is a vector of residuals.
Next, one defines the transformed unit direction vector of
the antenna articulations:
ra (43)
rb = r = VT ra
r,
The singular-value decomposition and the vector trans-
formations in Eqs. (42) and (43) can be used to pose an
equivalent optimal estimation problem in terms of the
unknown components of f:
find: f-R, ;rb ;r,l (44a)
to minimize:
J"(—)
nonsp 
1 _ 2 1 _ 2 1 _ 2 1 T (44b)
(r)=.2 (6a ra — Zia) -1 2(6b rb — Zb) +,2—(6c rc — Zc) +, ,Zr
subject to: r`a2+r`b2+r'`2_1 (44c)
This optimization problem can be solved by first adjoin-
ing the unit-norm constraint in Eq. (44c) to the cost function
in Eq. (44b) using the undetermined Lagrange multiplier
µ/2. Next, one takes the first derivatives of the resulting
Lagrangian with respect to the elements of f and one solves
the resulting equations to yield:
6'Z' - 
6bzb' ' u+
- ~~z~ (45)
r~, = rb = and r~ _
u+tea u+-e~2
These results are then substituted into the equality constraint
in Eq. (44c) to yield a single equation in the single unknown
µ:
26
This equation can be transformed into a 6th-order polyno-
mial inµ via multiplication by the product of all the
denominator factors in Eq. (46):
5 0-(~l+6a2)2(~l+6b2)2(p+6,,2)2-6'2Z'2(p+6b2)2(p+6'2)
2-6b2Zb2(N'+6,2)20,+6c2)2
-6'2Z'2 (}l+6aZ)Z(P+
6b2)2 (47)
The polynomial in Eq. (47) is solved using standard
10 numerical techniques. The solution procedure will normally
yield 6 possible values of µ. The correct value must be real.
Typically, it is the minimum real value that is no smaller than
—a'2, which guarantees that the minimum is global. Special
cases might arise in which a smaller value ofµ yields the
15 optimum if a'2z'2-0.
Given the globally-optimizing value of µ, it can be
substituted into Eq. (45) to determine the elements of f,,,
and Eq. (43) can be inverted to determine YaPtPt. This
value of Y,,, is guaranteed to satisfy the unit normalization
20 
constraint in Eq. (40c) by virtue of the unit normalization
constraint on YPt in Eq. (44c) and by virtue of the orthogo-
nality of the V matrix.
Given this non-spoofed) apt, estimate and a spoofed-case
25 0Pt estimate computed as per Eqs. (22) and (23), the
spoofing detection hypothesis test statistic for this scenario
is
Y=JP(g1 P)-J on P(Aa P) (48)
30
As in Section IV.C, the spoofing detection test takes the
form: Accept the non-spoofed hypothesis Ho if y>_y,; oth-
erwise, accept the spoofed hypothesis Hi. This makes sense
because one would expect 7 o P(ra Pt) to be small, 7P(r1 Pt)
35 to be large, and y to be a positive number if there were no
spoofing. Conversely, one would expect J_,(raPt) to be
large, 7P(rgPt) to be small, and y to be a negative number if
a spoofing attack were in progress. This is not an optimal
Neyman-Pearson test because of the use of optimal esti-
40 mates for the unknown values of rl and ra rather than
integration over their possible ranges, but experience shows
that this type of test is likely to have good detection power.
B. Approximation of Non-Spoofed and Spoofed Probabil-
45 ity Density Functions of Spoofing Detection Statistic,
Unknown Attitude
The spoofing detection threshold design begins with a
derivation of the probability distribution of the detection
statistic under the assumption of no spoofing, p(ylra,Ho).
50 This analysis must account for the effects of the zero-mean,
identity-covariance Gaussian random vector v as it propa-
gates through the two optimizations involved in computing
y, the rl Pt calculation and the rapt calculation. The impor-
tant new aspect of this analysis for the moving-base/un-55 
known-attitude test is the effect of the optimal estimation of
rapt on this propagation.
Analysis of the non-spoofed case yields the following
approximation for the spoofing detection statistic:
60
_,2Z,2 + 2 22 + _ Z``  - 1 (46) Y = 2g on p(ra)g a p(ra) +S o p(ra)v + ZvT [H P(ra) 
(49)
- iea4iea41V 
+~e)2 (u+_,2)2
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where the L-by-I vector g o P(iJ and the L-by-L symmet-
ric matrix H o P(r,) are
g_,(Y,) = (7 — QR44QR44)BP,
~BTB Yp 1 BT
H -,(Ya) _ [B 01
rp 0 [0]
(50a) 5 g, (q) = BT, (q) —
(50b)
28
R44r7
R44 7
R44 7
R44 J
(54a)
10 f HP(i)—[B0] 
{BTB+µ(r7)[1 
T,(q)l 
i BT (54b)
~ 
ra(,7) 0 J 0 J
The formula for y in Eq. (49) is exact to second order in the
noise vector v. It can be derived by approximating the
first-order optimality necessary conditions for the solution to The 3-by-I unit direction vector i a(q) in these formulas is
the problem in Eqs. (40a)-(40c). This particular approxima- 15 the solution to an auxiliary articulation direction estimation
tion is carried out to first order in v starting with recognition problem that takes the form of Eqs. (40a)-(40c), except with
that the non-homogeneous vector [z4r; ... ; z4L] is equal to z i replaced by R44'1 for all GNSS satellites j=1, ... , L. The
Bra+v in the non-spoofed case. The resulting derivation is scalar Lagrange multiplier µ(,q) is the value that solves Eq.
straightforward, but somewhat lengthy. (47) in the process of solving for i J'q).20
Note that the H o P(ra) matrix in Eq. (50b) is a projection The approximation in Eq. (53) is valid to second order in
matrix. Two of its eigenvalues equal 1, and the rest equal 0; the noise vector v. It can be derived by approximating the
it projects onto a 2-dimensional subspace. first-order optimality necessary conditions for the solution to
The dominant random term in Eq. (49) is g o PT(ra)v. Its the problem in Eqs. (40a)-(40c). This latter approximation is
variance is typically much larger than that of the quadratic 25 carried out to first order in v by recognizing that the
term non-homogeneous vector [z41, . . . , 
z4L]T is equal to
[R44'111
 
.... R44Lq]T+v in the spoofed case. The resulting
derivation is lengthy and somewhat tricky.
1 One difficult part of the derivation relies on the equation:
2°T [H—, —QR44gR44]V 30
It is also typically much larger than the variance of the
neglected higher-order terms in v.
35
The dominance of the randomness in g_PT(r')v implies
that a Gaussian approximation of y is reasonable for this
non-spoofed case. Thus
p(vi~dHo)~n[v,vnonP(Aa),6 o P(~a)] (51)
where the mean and standard deviation of this approxima-
tion are:
1 1 (52a)
'Y_
 = ZgwT _,(ra)gnon,v(ra) + ~trace[H»o»,,(ra) — QR44QR441
Eynon ~(ra) 
_ 
(52b)
1 [Hnonsp (Ya) — QR44QR441
gnon~(ra)g~ v(ra)+Ztrace [H,(r,)—QR44QR441
The trace( ) function is the usual sum of the diagonal
elements of its square matrix argument.
Analysis of the spoofed case yields a detection statistic
approximation that is somewhat similar to that from the
non-spoofed case:
Y=—ZgT,P(77)g,P(77)+gTP(17)v+ZvT[HP(7)—QR44QR441V 
(53)
1
gsp 
(17)BAY'
— 
ZI~(rI)D r, DYp
(55)
in order to recognize that a seemingly first-order term in the
unit-vector perturbation Ai,=t•ra(rq) is actually second-
order in this small quantity. This substitution is crucial to the
40 proof that a first-order approximation of how Ara depends on
v can be used to achieve a second-order approximation of
how the optimized 7 o P(ra) depends on v. Equation (55)
can be derived by considering the first-order necessary
conditions that are obeyed by ia(q) and µ('q) and by recog-
45 nizing that the unit normalization constraint on the perturbed
solution ia(q)+Ai, can be manipulated into the form
1
Similar to the non-spoofed case, the term gPT(rq)v on the
right-hand side of Eq. (53) is usually the dominant source of
55 random variations. That is, its variance is much larger than
those of the quadratic term
60 2 [Hsp(r7)—QR44QR441v
and the neglected higher-order v terms. Therefore, a Gauss-
ian approximation of the spoofing detection statistic is
65 reasonable in this spoofed case:
where the L-by-I residuals vector gP(q) and the L-by-L
symmetric matrix HP(q) are p(y1gH1)rN[y;y,(q),6rP(T1)1 (56)
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with the mean and standard deviation:
KQ1)
1 1 57a 
 
P-1
»e~2dYae < aw,
8~(~7)8v(~7)+~trace[/1r(~7)—QRanQR441 
( )
5
(57b)
1 [HSP (77) — QR44QR441'
-Y" (77) = ST,, (i7)S v (q) + 1 trace r[Hsp (r7) — QR44QR441
C. Design of Worst-Case Spoofing Detection Threshold
and Analysis of Worst-Case Detection Probability, Unknown
Attitude
One might be tempted to compute the spoofing detection
threshold Yth using p(YIr,HO) in Eq. (51) along with the
desired false-alarm rate a, similar to what is done in Eq. (36)
for the known-attitude case. This is impractical, however,
because the mean and standard deviation that define p(Ylra,
Ho) are functions of the unknown true antenna articulation
direction ra. One might try using the estimated value of this
vector, rapt, but a safer approach is to use a worst-case
direction.
The worst-case value of the articulation direction ra can be
defined as follows: It is the direction which gives the highest
possible false-alarm probability for the designed spoofing
detection threshold value Yth. Suppose that the worst-case
direction is denoted as Yawn. This direction and the corre-
sponding spoofing detection threshold Yth can be computed
simultaneously for a given worst-case false-alarm probabil-
ity a-o.
The first step is to compute the transformed detection
threshold that would produce the false-alarm probability oL_,
if p(Y I Ho) were a Gaussian with zero mean and unit variance.
Call this value xwo. It is the solution of
w(e' (5 8)
aw, - J e 
ynel2dyne
2n
This value is a measure of the offset of the spoofing
detection threshold from the mean of p(YIra,Ho) measured in
units of standard deviations of p(YIYa,H0). This xwo is nor-
mally a negative number because oL_, is normally much less
than 0.5.
The transformed detection threshold is used to define an
optimization problem that can be solved in order to deter-
mine the worst-case antenna articulation direction vector
and the corresponding worst-case spoofing detection thresh-
old. The optimization problem is:
find: is (59a)
to minimize: J,,(Pa= .. P(Q+K_Gy_ P(Q (59b)
subject to: raTra 1 (59c)
The antenna articulation direction that minimizes the cost
function in Eq. (59b) is i_, the one that produces the
highest probability of false alarm for the given spoofing
detection test. The corresponding worst-case spoofing detec-
tion threshold is equal to the value of the minimum cost:
Yth 77th (Yawn). Given that J,th(iJ2:J,th(rawo) for any other
articulation direction Ya the corresponding false alarm prob-
ability for the direction Ya is
(60)
where x(r~=[Yth
—
YnonP(ra)]la7nonP(ra). The inequality
Y1h—J7th(rawc):5J7th(ra) can be manipulated algebraically and
then combined with the definition of x(rj to prove that
10 x(ia)<—K_,. This latter inequality leads directly to the inequal-
ity in Eq. (60). Thus, oL_, truly is the worst-case false-alarm
probability.
Solution of the constrained nonlinear optimization prob-
lem in Eqs. (59a)-(59c) can be carried out using a suitable
15 numerical method. In the tests of Section IX, Newton's
method has been used with enhancements to ensure global
convergence and to enforce the normalization constraint.
The method starts with a guess of rawo that satisfies the
constraint, and it computes increments that continue to
20 
satisfy this constraint while decreasing the cost. The incre-
ments are computed by developing a second-order expan-
sion of the cost function variations that applies in the
2-dimensional local null space of the normalization con-
25 straint. Global convergence is enforced by using a quadratic
trust-region step size restriction when solving for the incre-
ment in the null-space of the constraint.
It is important to start the numerical solution of the
optimization problem in Eqs. (59a)-(59c) in with a reason-
3o able first guess of i_. Otherwise, the iterative numerical
solution procedure can take too much computation time or
it can even fail to converge to the global minimum. The first
guess algorithm recognizes that the gnonPT(Y,) terms are the
dominant terms in the formulas for yl,(ij and ay o P(ra)
35 in Eqs. (52a) and (52b). Therefore, it finds the values of Ya
that maximize or minimize g_PT(iJg_,(iJ. Consistent
with the formula for gnonP(Ya) in Eq. (50a), these values of
Ya and the associated extrema of g_PT(iJg_,(iJ can be
found by computing the singular value decomposition of the
40 L-by-3 matrix (I—gx44gx44)B. The minimum and maximum
values of g_PT(Ya)gnonP( a) are then used in truncated
versions of Eqs. (52a) and (52b) to compute the approxi-
mations Ynon P(Ya)=0.59nonPT(ra)gnonP(ra) and 67non P(U
45 [gnon P(Ugnon P(Y
a)]0_5. These approximations, in turn, are
used to compute corresponding approximations of J,th(Ya)
from Eq. (59b). For the approximation of J7th(Y.) that is the
smallest, the corresponding value of Ya from the singular
decomposition of (I—gx44gx44 )B is used as the first guess of
50 ia-1.
Given the spoofing detection threshold Yth from the worst-
case analysis, the final analysis problem is to compute the
probability of a missed detection. This calculation involves
p(YIrq,Hr). Unfortunately, this probability density function
55 depends on the unknown true value of the spoofed-case dot
product q. As in the case of a known articulation direction
vector, the case of Section IV, a worst-case value of rl is
computed and used in order to remove the rl dependence.
The worst-case value of rl is the one that produces the largest60 possible value of PmD.
The worst-case value of rl is the solution to the following
optimization problem:
65 
find: q (61a)
to minimize:
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JPMD (l) 
_-Y,(77)Yr-Y,(77)(77) (61b)
o-y v(77)
subject to: -1sq l (61c)
This is a relatively simple constrained 1-dimensional non-
linear optimization problem. It is solved using Newton's
method with enhancements to enforce the inequality con-
straints, if one or the other of them is active, and to ensure
global convergence.
It is helpful to start the numerical solution of the problem
in Eqs. (61a)-(61 c) with a good first guess of the solution
,q_,. A good first guess comes from recognizing that, in a
well-designed spoofing detection test, the gPT(rl)gP(rl)
terms are the dominant terms in the formulas for yP(q) and
ayP(rq) in Eqs. (57a) and (57b). Also, the term —
yP(rl)/ayP(rl) in Eq. (61b) contains the dominant q depen-
dence of J mD(q). Under these two assumptions, a reason-
able first guess of rlwe is
gR44 BYamineig (62)
z
(Raa)
=1
where Yamineigis a unit-normalized eigenvector of the 3-by-3
symmetric matrix
BT(I-9R449R44T)B (63)
It is the eigenvector associated with the minimum eigen-
value. It is straightforward to prove that this combination of
,1 minimizes gPT(rl)gP(rl) with gP(rl) defined in Eq. (54a).
The proof involves the recognition that the unit-vector
U'q)=Yamineig where the function r(q) is defined in connec-
tion with Eq. (54a). One can show that this first guess of q_,
is guaranteed to respect the inequality constraints in Eq.
(61c) because it amounts to a weighted average of the
unit-vector dot products (?)Tramineig for j=1, ... , L, each of
which obeys the constraints.
Given the value q_, that solves the optimization problem
in Eqs. (61a)-(61c), the worst-case probability of missed
detection is
PMDwc = 1 e 
[r-r,,,Rdy (64)
1 J e ,2d/2dYne
32
The inequality at the end of Eq. (65) is true because the
lower limit in this integral will be no smaller than the lower
limit in the corresponding integral of Eq. (64) by virtue of
rlwe being the value that minimizes J mD(q).
5 These false-alarm and missed-detection probability cal-
culations need to be re-evaluated from time to time. They
must be re-computed each time there is a change in the set
of available GNSS signals and each time there are signifi-
cant changes in any of the following quantities: the duration
to of the spoofing detection batch interval, the interval's
antenna articulation time history pa(t), the direction vectors
to the GNSS spacecraft, ? for j=1, ... , L, or the carrier-
to-noise ratios of the GNSS signals. Although their deriva-
tions are long and complex, these calculations involve only
15 matrix-matrix, matrix-vector, and nonlinear optimization
calculations for low-dimensional problems. Therefore, they
can be executed very rapidly on typical processors, and they
can be implemented in a practical real-time system.
VI. Spoofing Detection Hypothesis Test for Moving-Base
20 UE with Unknown Attitude and Unknown Articulation
Amplitude
A third version of the spoofing detection test with uni-
axial antenna articulation allows for the possibility that the
amplitude of the motion is also unknown. This could happen
25 if a system such as that shown in FIG. 3 were excited by an
initial impulse of uncertain amplitude. It also could happen
with an antenna mounted on a UAV where the antenna
articulations were caused by rapid controller-induced atti-
tude motions and where the gain of the transfer function
30 from the control inputs to the antenna motions was uncer-
tain. In this case, it is necessary to estimate both the direction
of antenna articulation and an articulation amplitude scaling
factor. It is assumed that there is a known minimum antenna
articulation amplitude. Otherwise, the spoofing detection
35 test could be very weak due to having an articulation
amplitude that was too small.
A. Spoofing Detection Hypothesis Test, Unknown Atti-
tude and Unknown Amplitude Scaling
As with the previous two tests, a test statistic based on
40 optimal estimates of unknown parameters is used in place of
a truly optimal Neyman-Pearson test. This approach is used
because it is easier to implement and because it typically
involves only a small degradation of detection power for a
given false-alarm probability.
45 For the non-spoofed case, the spoofing detection calcu-
lation must estimate the product of the unknown articulation
direction ra and an articulation amplitude scaling factor a.
This scaling factor is defined so that the nominal articulation
amplitude time history in the ra direction is pa(t) while the
50 true time history is apa(t). Supposed that one defines the
un-normalized vector ra=ai,. Suppose also, without loss of
generality, that pa(t) and a are defined to set the known lower
bound for a equal to 1. Then the following optimization
problem is solved to estimate the direction/amplitude prod-
55 uct vector ra:
The transformation from the first integral to the second
integral is carried out by the change of dummy integration
variable from y to yna [y—yP(11_J]/a,P(g_J. For any other
actual rl value, the probability of missed detection is 60
(' (65)
PMD(77) 
_ 
J e y»e/2dNd :~ PMD—
65
find: ra (66a)
to minimize:
1 (66b)
Jaoa,,R(re) = 2 
Y,{R44 )T re~ - 
}z
j=1
subject to: raTraal (66c)
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where R44' and z4' for j=1, ... , L are computed as defined
in Eqs. (17) and (18). The cost function in Eq. (66b) is
identical to the non-spoofed cost function in the previous
spoofing detection calculation, the one in Eq. (40b).
The optimization problem in Eqs. (66a)-(66c) can be
solved in almost an identical manner to the solution of the
equality-constrained problem for ra in Eqs. (40a)-(40c). The
only difference is that the initial trial solution assumes that
the inequality constraint in Eq. (66c) is inactive. The con-
straint can be ignored in this case, andµ can be set equal to
0 in Eq. (45) to determine the components of YPt that are
used to compute the initial trial solution ra PtVr'oP,. If this
trial value of raoP, satisfies the inequality in Eq. (66c), then
the solution procedure is done. If this candidate raP, violates
Eq. (66c), however, then Eq. (47) is used to determine the
Kuhn-Tucker multiplier µ. A negative value ofµ that satis-
fies Eq. (47) must be used for the final solution in order to
satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker first-order optimality conditions.
For the spoofed case, the original unknown dot product
between unit vectors rl=(FP)Tra is redefined to become the
product of the unknown amplitude scaling factor and the
unknown dot product: rl=a(i P)Tra(FP)Tra. The practical
effect of this re-definition of rl is that it is no longer
constrained to lie in the range because of the
possibility that a>l. Therefore, the spoofed-case estimation
problem becomes that of finding rl to minimize the cost
function in Eq. (21) subject to no constraints on rq. The
minimizing value is just the unconstrained minimum rl "Pt
from Eq. (22).
Given the rapt solution to the problem in Eqs. (66a)-(66c)
and the rl"Pt estimate from Eq. (22), this case uses the
spoofing detection hypothesis test statistic
Y=JP(qu P)-J on P(ra P) (67)
The spoofing detection test has the same form is in the
previous two cases: Accept the non-spoofed hypothesis Ho
if y>_y,; otherwise, accept the spoofed hypothesis Hr. Again,
this is sensible because J"o"P(raPt) should be small, JP
(rl"Pt) should be large, and y should be a positive number
without spoofing. The quantity J"o",(rapt) should be large,
7P(rquPt) should be small, and y should be a negative
number during a spoofing attack.
B. Approximation of Non-Spoofed and Spoofed Probabil-
ity Density Functions of Spoofing Detection Statistic,
Unknown Attitude and Unknown Amplitude Scaling
As in the analyses of the previous spoofing detection
statistics, design of the detection threshold and analysis of
the probability of missed detection begin with the determi-
nation of p(ylra,Ho), the non-spoofed probability density of
the detection statistic. This analysis quantifies the impact of
the random vector v on y as propagated through the rl "Pt and
rapt calculations. That quantification is similar to Eq. (49)
for the known-amplitude case. It is approximated to 2"d
order in v as follows:
1 (68)
Y - ZSTa,,,P(ra)Snon P(ra) +
1 1 _~
STa P(ra)v+ 2
vT(HwP — iRa4iR44T)v-2v 
(r'
)
where the function g"o"P(r,) is the same as in Eq. (50a) and
where the L-by-L symmetric matrix H'"o"P B(BTB)-rBTis
a projection matrix. The scalar random variable v(ra)
accounts for the fact that the noise vector v may cause the
ra calculation to produce a negative Kuhn-Tucker multiplier
µ even though µ-0 would since in the absence of noise
M-1
because the true ra respects the inequality in Eq. (66c). This
scalar random variable is correlated with the random vector
v, as is a related zero-mean, unit-variance scalar Gaussian
random variable v(r,). These two distributions and their
5 relationships to each other and to v are characterized by the
following formulas:
v(r,) - -V.—(r,) if v(ra) < v.—(r,) (69)
10 
v(ra)=j
l 0 if -V.—(r,) :~ v(ra)
where
-T (70a)
v(r,) = g (r,)v
15 1 _ rp rp (70b)
2 rp (BT B)
-1 
r,
with q(ra) being the following unit-normalized L-by-I vec-
20 tor:
B(BTB)- ira (71)i(ra)
25 rT(BTB)
-i
ra
If raTra»l, then v_(r,)«0, and the contribution of v(ra)
to the randomness in y becomes negligible, as one would
expect.
3o The derivation of the approximation in Eq. (68) is similar
to the derivation of the approximation in Eq. (49) for the
known-amplitude case. The terms
35 1 T 1~2Zv HonPv-Zv (ra)
40
in Eq. (68) constitute the modified form of the term
1
2 
VT
H onsp (ra)v
45 in Eq. (49) when the equality constraint in Eq. (40c) is
replaced by the inequality constraint in Eq. (66c). This
replacement leads to a negativity constraint on the Kuhn-
Tucker multiplierµ associated with the Eqs. (66a)-(66c)
optimal solution, and this constraint is what modifies the
50 original
1
2
VT 
H onsp (ra)v
55
term. There was no sign constraint on the corresponding
Lagrange multiplier for the Eqs. (40a)-(40c) optimum.
Similar to the known-amplitude case, the dominant ran-
dom term in Eq. (68) is g"o"PT(r,)v. Normally its variance
60 is significantly larger than the variance of the quadratic
terms
1 T T 1 _2
65 2 v [H_, - QR44QR44] v and - 2V (ra).
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This variance is also normally a lot larger than the variance
of the neglected higher order v terms. Therefore, it is
reasonable to approximate the probability density function
of y in the non-spoofed case by a Gaussian:
p(1' 1 rdHo)~'~[1';'y~ P(ra),6~ P(ra)1 (72)
where the mean and standard deviation of this approxima-
tion are:
(73a)
Zg ,_,(r,)g.-,(r,) + Ztrace[H;,o,,,p — gR44gR441 — 24 ,(ra)
dynon,~(ra) 
_
1 gR44 g T
g_1,—T ,p(r,)g—„,(r,) + pace 
R441 
+0,,,(r,)
[H~, 
— gR44gR441
where
(ra) = E 
_V2(r'))
_(,a) 
[v - U_(ra)l2d,2/2 d”
2n J-
vmaxo-a)/z
1 _'(") z
[1+"~ e ° lzd"v
2
E{[gTa 
wz
1
2Et [H,_,— gR44 gR44)v — trace(Hm' v — gR44gR44)
l wz +4E{v4(ra)}- 4~n,(ra)
z
E{[gTaa,(r,)vlw (ra)-4,(ra)
z
gTa»,~(ra)i(ra)E{v(ra)w
g"'(ra)i(ra) 
7E~(,a) 
[v- vm_(ra)lz_°2/2 dv 
2n
2v 
gTa 
(r,)4(r,)~-2e m_(,,)12 
—2im_(r,) f 
m (")e 
v2/zd"vj
2
E{[vT (H„o».,~ - gR44gT44)V - trace(H;,o,,,p - gR44gR44)1
_
iT(ra)(Hno T
— 
gR44gR 
z
44)i(ra)E{"2(ra)w (ra)— ~.(ra)])
—
gT (r,)(H,~r,iP — 
gR44gR44)4
(r,)
1 ~(") z z _;
,2/zJ m v [v - vmax(ra)~ e d"v-~»,(ra) 
_
iT (r,)(H;,~„P - gR44gT44)i(r,)~2 
f 
'm-(')e 
v2/2 d"v)
2n 1
1 fm—(") 
E{
4 
v (ra)} 
_ 
~~ 
[v - vmax(ra)14e z /z dp =
_z 
[vmax(ra)+5vm-(ra)le 
°max(,,)/2
1 
M_ 
(r) z["vm_(ra)+6"vm_(ra)+3]~E e /zd"v
(73b)
k1,
unit-variance Gaussian distribution between negative infin-
ity and vm_(ra). Any good statistical functions software
package should contain a standard function that computes
this integral.
5 For the spoofed case, the approximate model of the
dependence of y on v is derived in a manner similar to the
analysis that produced the corresponding known-amplitude
model in Eq. (53). It involves consideration of the optimized
10 non-spoofed and spoofed cost functions, as per Eqs. (66a)-
(66c) and as per Eq. (22) when the actual data obeys the
spoofed model. The approximate model for the detection
statistic, valid to second order in v, is
15
Y=
1_T _ T 1 T T 1_2 y
— ~g,ry (r7)g,ry (r7) + g,p (r7)V + V [H~ (r7) — gR44gR441 V — V (r7)b (r7)
(76)
20(74a) 
where the L-by-I residuals vector A P(q) and the L-by-L
symmetric matrix H'P(q) are
25 R44r7 (77a)
R44 i
g(~7) = Br, (77) - R4,,  R447
(74b) 30 RL i
H,,,(r7) = B[BTB+µ(r7)l] iBT (77b)
35 The 3-by-I vector ra (q) in these formulas is the solution to
(75a) 
an auxiliary articulation-direction/articulation-scaling-factor
estimation problem that takes the form of Eqs. (66a)-(66c),
except with z4' replaced by R4j for all GNSS satellites
j=1, ... , L. The scalar Kuhn-Tucker multiplier µ(rd) is the
4o 
associated value that is determined when solving for ra(q).
It is determined using Eq. (47) if the inequality constraint in
Eq. (66c) is active, and it is non-positive in this case, but
µ(r))-0 if the inequality constraint is inactive, i.e., if raT(q)
(75b) 45 
ra(11N. 
,~
The scalar random variable v(q) accounts for the effects
of the inequality constraint and its variations of activity or
inactivity, depending on the specific values of v and r). It is
defined as follows:
50
v(77) if µ(r7) < 0 and v(q) < vm-1(77) (78)
VM_'(17) if u(q) < 0 and vm_,(q) < v(q)
55 V(71) - VM_.(?7) if µ(77) = 0 and v(77) < VM_.(?7)
(75c) 0 if µ(q) = 0 and VM_.(?7) < v(77)
60
Note that the same probability integral appears in the final 65
versions of the right-hand sides of Eqs. (74a) and (75a)-
(75c). It is the cumulative probability for a scalar zero-mean,
where
-T (79a)
v(q) = g (q)v
Vm-1(77) 
_ 
(79b)
r, (q) [BT B +7z (77)7 l r, (q) _
ra(77)[BTB+7z(,7)l] 1BTB[BTB+7z(,7)7] lr,(q)
(85a)
f--1('1)-2 __2/2 _ VY7)2/2
ve ° dv+ J e ° dv=
_2
°max~(j)/2
+
Em-~ 
axe('1) __272
e ev
2n
(85b)
E{[a,p(7)v]w2(7)S(7) 
2
8sP(?7)Q(?7)E{v(~7)w (~7)S(~7) - .,p(~7)~} = 8sp q(q)
1 J /'°ro dm-1('/)_3 v2 2 -
V
Vmaxc (r7)  - v2 2V e v+ ve dv
2 2~r '(")
-2
y 
_ _ — M—,('/)/2 
107)S (r7)=8,,p (r7)i(r7) 
-~ 
EI[vT (H;p{rJ} - gR44iR44)v - trace(H,;,Ir7) - gR44iR44)]
4T (7)(Hp{ 1} - gR44gR44)g(1)E{U2(7)~U2(7)S(7) 
gT
-(77)(H"1771 
— gR44gR44)g(r7) X
{ 1 f m 
l 
-1(0-4 2 2
v  dv+
_z
vm~ (7) (~ 
-2 -_2 zV e
J ° l dv6'(77) _M_' ('1) 
_2 
_, 
(,,)/2
-T - 2Umax.(,7)~ °m
g (r7)(H,ry{r7} — gR44 
gT 
R44)g(r7) — 
_V_~ 
+
E~4(77) 
2 axd~) _2 y2/z
~~ v e dv
-a
4z/2 d- V-(77) + m ( ~ e- v lz d vv e =
3 2
_4
°max~(~)/z
vm_1(77)- +
-4 
~~(~) 2[3 - vmax1(7)] 
f 
_ 
e /2 dv
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-continued
(79c)
vmaxu(~7) 
_ _ _
2 r (q)(BTB) l Ya(7)
with the unit-normalized L-by-I vector q(rl) being defined
as:
38
The calculations that determine the scalar quantities 
~P
(rl) and V P(q) differ depending on whether the constrained
non-spoofed optimization applies, raT(rl)ra(rl)=1 and µ(rl)
<0, or the unconstrained optimization applies, raT(q%(rl)>_1
5 and µ(rl)O. In the constrained case, these quantities are
computed using the following formulas for various of their
components:
10 _z 1
BTB+p(7)7~ lYa(7) (80) E{v ('7)J -
1I r,(i7)[BTB+7z(,7)l] 
-1 
-1
l r,(q)
15
The two upper-most conditions in Eq. (78) deal with the
active constraint case, in which raT  The two
lower-most conditions cover the inactive constraint case,
i.e., the case when raT(rl)ra (rl)>I.
The coefficient of function that multiplies v(q) in Eq. 20
(76) is
Ya(,7)~BTB+P(,7)l~ 1B~BTB+72(,7)7 lr,(~7) (81) 25
r, (i7)[BTB +72(,7)7 lYa(q)
When µ(rl)O, i.e., in the inactive constraint case, this 30
coefficient equals 1.
As for all preceding models of all preceding detection
statistics, the model in Eq. (76) is dominated by the term
APT(II)v. Its variance is typically much larger than that of
35
1 T T
 
1-2
2 v [H,;p(i7) - gR44gR44] v, of - 2V (77)07),
or of the neglected higher-order terms in v. Given that this 40
dominant term is Gaussian, the following Gaussian distri-
bution is a reasonable approximation of the detection sta-
tistic probability density function in the spoofed case:
p(viq,H.)~N[v1v=P(q),6',P(Tl)] (82) 45
with the mean and standard deviation:
1 _T _ 1 T 1 (83a)
Z9v(7)9v(7)+2trace[H,(v(q)-gR44gR441- Z~v(17) 50
(83b)
--T -- 1 [HsP (r7)—gR44gR44]'
S,p (77)S,p (77) + Ztracej T +0,(77)v 7[Hp(7)-gR44gR44] J 55
where
v(77)=07)E{ 2('7)) 
(84a)
11//,, ( T _z (84b) 
60
0'(77) = —Et [SsP (~J)v][vP(~J)1) —
1 
l
ZE{[vT(Hg 1171-gR4 j )v-t ce(H, {,7}-gR~ qT )]
2 4[ (77)07) -607)1 + 45(77)r{v(77)} 44,07) 65 In the unconstrained case, on the other hand, the following
alternate formulas apply for the needed components of
~ P(rl) and iVP(rl):
(85c)
(85d)
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z 1 (~) _ _ (86a)
E{v (7)} w - 
vm_c(77)]2 e_2/z 
dv =
_2
vmaxc(i7)e vm 
... (y)/2 
_2 1 axc(~) z 2 
-
vm-1(77)] J e ev
E{ [gSP (7) v~ w2 
~', 
(,7)]} 
_ 
(86b)
ST 
(77) 
z
g(~7)E{v(77)w (~7)S(~7) ,— .v(~7)~} = S, q(q)
1 1v 
— vm—,(,7)]2e °2/2 ev~5 (J) = 5,,,(q)g(q)
_2
_2e °m_c('d/2 1 axd~) 2
-2vm_c(~7) 
1 fvm 
e° l2dv 07)
127 
(86c)
E [vT (H p{ 7} - gR44ga44)v - trace(H,;,{rr)- gR44ga44)]
w2(7)S(7)- v(7)~}_
4T (7)(E1 "{ 7} - gR44ga44)g(J)E{v2(7)
gT
-(77)(H"1771 
- gR44gR44)g(r7) x
{ 1 —c('I)_z _ _ z v2 27~~ v w-vm_c(,7)] e dv2ar 
lllI4,(77)1 = gT (l)(E~ry{ 7} — gR44gR44)
1 (") _y2 2
g(77) 2— 
Jm—c 
e dv 07)
4 1 ~ (7) _ _ 4 z (86d)
E{v (77)} 
_ 
7 f V 
c 
V - vm_c(,7)] e° l2 d  =
2n
wm3
2—C(,l)/2
axc(7)+Svm_c(17)]e °m
xc('7) 2
[vm_c (q) + 6vm_c (q) + 3] 
v 
e ° l2 d v
1 f2n
C. Design of Worst-Case Spoofing Detection Threshold
and Analysis of Worst-Case Detection Probability, Unknown
Attitude and Unknown Amplitude Scaling
Given the Gaussian p(ylra,Ho) probability density func-
tion defined by Eqs. (72)-(75c), it is possible to compute a
spoofing detection threshold value y, that achieves a worst-
case probability of missed detection awe. The approach
taken here is similar to what is done in Subsection VC for
the known-amplitude case.
The first step of the threshold calculation computes Kw,
from aw, using Eq. (58). The second step solves an optimi-
zation problem to find the worst-case product of the antenna
articulation direction vector and scaling amplitude ra that
produces the lowest threshold for the target false-alarm
probability. This problem is
find: ra (87a)
to minimize: J'd,(ra)=y' P(ra)+Kw~dr„.. P(Fa) (87b)
subject to: ra7raal (87c)
The antenna articulation-direction/scaling product that mini-
mizes the cost function in Eq. (87b) is raw,. It yields the
highest probability of false alarm for the given spoofing
detection test. The corresponding worst-case spoofing detec-
RE
tion threshold is equal to the value of the minimum cost:
yth-J, th (raw,). As in Subsection VC, it is easy to show that
o#Ja 5oL_, i.e., that the spoofing detection false-alarm prob-
ability for any actual true value of ra is no greater than a_,.
5 The optimization problem in Eqs. (87a)-(87c) can be
solved using a numerical method. Newton's method will
serve if it has been enhanced to ensure global convergence
and enforce the inequality constraint in Eq. (87c). Such an
approach has been used for the tests of Section IX. It is
to similar to the one used to solve the problem in Eqs.
(59a)-(59c) for the known-amplitude case. In addition, it
uses the same procedure to generate its first guess of rawer as
is used to generate the first guess of the Yaws solution to the
problem in Eqs. (59a)-(59c). Thus, the first guess obeys
15 raw.Traw.- I. This makes sense because this is the lowest
possible amplitude, and the lowest possible amplitude is
likely to give the highest probability of generating a false
alarm.
Also similar to the known-amplitude case, a worst-case
20 probability of missed detection is calculated by computing
the corresponding worst true value of rl=a(?P)Ti, (?P)Tr,.
The worst-case value is the solution to the following opti-
mization problem:
25 
find: q (88a)
to minimize:
30 Yrh -Y p(7) (88b)
7PMD(17)=
This I-dimensional nonlinear optimization problem is
35 solved using a numerical technique similar to the one that is
used to solve the corresponding problem for the known-
amplitude worst-case probability of missed detection, the
problem in Eqs. (61a)-(61c). The algorithm for solving the
present problem is somewhat simpler due to the lack of any
40 inequality constraints here. The similarity of the problems
and cost functions in Eqs. (61a)-(61c) allows the same
procedure to be used in order to generate the initial guess of
rlw,, as per Eqs. (62) and (63). This guess produces a
corresponding value of Ya(rlw,) that obeys YaT(rlw~)ra(rlw~)-
45 1. This makes sense because the worst-case probability of
missed detection would tend to correspond to the lowest
possible amplitude of antenna articulation.
The optimal rlw, that solves the problem in Eqs. (88a) and
(88b) can be used to compute the worst-case probability of
50 missed detection
1 2 ( )
PMDwc = 
e[r P(~wc)] /[z{~y,,P(~wc)}2] dY
—V y,(~7wc) ynd
55
/21 e y d d)l d
V ".~PMD(~/wc)
By an analysis similar to that which produced Eq. (65) in the
6o known-amplitude case, it is straightforward to show that the
probability of missed detection for any other true value of rl
will be no greater than this worst-case probability.
VII. Spoofing Detection Hypothesis Test for Moving-
Base UE with Unknown Articulation Time Phasing
65 A fourth version of the spoofing detection test with
uni-axial antenna articulation allows for uncertainty in the
time phasing of the pa(t) antenna articulation time history.
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Such uncertainty can be present when a system like that
shown in FIG. 3 is excited by an initial impulse of uncertain
time of application. This type of uncertainty also can occur
for an antenna mounted on a UAV if rapid controller-
induced attitude maneuvers are used to induce the high-
frequency antenna motion. Any uncertainty of the transfer-
function lag between the control inputs and the attitude
response will translate into a time phasing uncertainty. In
such cases, it is necessary to estimate a time offset of the
articulations, Ato, in addition to other quantities. This time
offset is defined so that the nominal articulation time history
pa(t) becomes pa(t—Ato) after correcting for the time phasing
error.
A. Estimation of Time Phasing via Outer Optimization
There are various possible approaches to dealing with Ato
uncertainty. The approach adopted here is to estimate Ato in
an outer nonlinear optimization calculation that does not
explicitly estimate other quantities needed to form a spoof-
ing detection statistic. The outer numerical optimization
problem is posed by exploiting the following fact of (-di-
mensional antenna articulations: All of the articulation-
induced carrier phase time histories for all channels are
multiples of pa(t—Ato) regardless of whether or not a spoof-
ing attack is in progress. Given this knowledge, one can
solve the over-determined least-squares estimation problem
in Eq. (16) for each GNSS satellite j=1, ... , L and then form
a Ato optimization cost function that is a weighted sum of the
residuals from each of the least-squares problems. Each of
these L solutions treats the value of the scalar (F )Ti, in Eq.
(16) as a different independent unknown so that the value
determined for the jth signal need not be related in any
particular way to the values determined for the other L—I
signals.
The minimum costs of these L linear least-squares opti-
mizations are combined with a cost that introduces a priori
Ato knowledge to yield a Ato estimation cost function of the
form:
1 Otp 2 1 L T J T (90)
2JPh,(Oto)_—~ +—~ (fJ) 
{,—d (Oto)[dJ 
(A
to)] }fi
0-Nro,2 j=1
where
@1 (91a)
@z
Pi 03
J
Y'Nj
dJ(Oto) = 
d, (Ato) (91b)
[dj(Ot0)]TdJ(Ot0)
with
Pi = [ — DJ [(DJ)T DJ]-1 (Di )T (92a)
Pa(T-idl (92b)
Pa (~ id2 — Oto)
di (Ato) = PJ Pa(Tmsd3 — Oto)
P, (T 
JmidNj — Oto)
42
-continued
1 0 0
1 2
1 (T.id2 — Tmidl) 2(Tmid2 — Tmidl)
5 1 z
DJ = 1 (Tmid3 — Tmidl) 2(Tmid3 — Tmidl)
1 2
1 (TmidN — Tmidl) (T 
)
— Tmidl)J 2 J
10
(92c)
The cost function ilhs(Ato) in Eq. (90) is a negative
log-likelihood cost function, and its auto P parameter is the
standard deviation of the a priori uncertainty about how
15 much Ato might differ from 0. The Nj-by-I vector F contains
the high-pass-filtered carrier phase time history for the jth
GNSS signal normalized by its measurement error standard
deviation. The Nj-by-I vector d (Ato) is a unit-normalized
version of the high-pass-filtered time history pa(t—Ato)
20 sampled at the midpoints of the accumulation intervals of
the jth signal. The Nj-by-Nj matrix V is a projection matrix
that performs the high-pass filtering for the jth signal, as is
evident by its definition in terms of the N.-by-3 matrix D.
P' projects signal time histories orthogonal to the constant,
25 linear, and quadratic time histories in the columns of D'.
The cost function in Eq. (90) can be optimized to deter-
mine Ato Pt by using standard numerical techniques, such as
Newton's method. Given that this involves unconstrained
optimization of a scalar, the implementation is straightfor-
ward.
A useful auxiliary quantity is the Cramer-Rao lower
bound on the uncertainty in Ato.pt. It takes the form:
35 1 (93)z
~Nroopr - 
1~2~ ~
P
80t02 .
40 B. Spoofing Detection Statistic with Timing Uncertainty
Given the estimate Ato Pt that minimizes the cost function
in Eq. (90), any of the three spoofing detection tests of
Sections IV-VI can be implemented by replacing pa(t) in
Eqs. (16) and (17) by pa(t—Ato). All of the subsequent
45 spoofing detection calculations can then be carried out by
using the resulting values of R44 and z4 for j=1, ... , L. The
ensuing calculations will yield a spoofing detection statistic
y that can be used to develop a powerful detection test.
C. Design of Spoofing Detection Threshold and Analysis
50 of False-Alarm Probability
One might try to use the corresponding pair of p(yIFlo) and
p(ylHl) probability density functions from Sections IV-VI
directly in the design of the spoofing detection threshold and
the analysis of the probability of missed detection for an
55 uncertain Ato case. One could substitute pa(t—Ato) for pa(t)
in any given analysis. This approach, however, is not exactly
right when working with an uncertain Ato and its estimate
Ato Pt. Complications occur because an additional source of
y variability arises from the impact of measurement noise on
60 the Ato Pt estimate.
One could do an exact or approximate analysis of the
impact of this Ato Pt variability on p(ylHo) and p(ylH1).
Perhaps a reasonable analysis would use a linear approxi-
mation of the effect of the noise vector v on the errors in
65 Ato Pt. Such an analysis might be rather complicated.
This case of uncertain Ato is not considered to be a very
important one because it is not a preferred mode of opera-
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tion. This case is considered here mostly because it is helpful
to the processing of experimental data from the initial
prototype spoofing detection system, where timing uncer-
tainty was present because the prototype articulation system
lacked a pa(t) sensor.
In an operational system, the need to estimate AtoPt opens
up the possibility of a new type of spoofing attack, one that
also simulates the expected non-spoofed carrier-phase
effects of pa(t). The spoofer might have an idea about the
types of pa(t) time histories, but knowledge of the exact
timing could be made virtually inaccessible to a spoofer.
Armed with the right pa(t) but the wrong Ato, however, a
spoofer might avoid detection by fooling the detection
system into choosing a value of AtoPt that aligned with the
spoofed version of pa(t). Therefore, a system that needs to
estimate Ato is undesirable and should be avoided.
Because this case is considered mostly in support of initial
prototype experiments, it has not been deemed worthwhile
to do a full analysis of the impacts of AtoPt, uncertainty.
Instead, the threshold calculations of the relevant previous
section have been carried out three different times using the
following three different candidate antenna articulation time
histories: pa(t—AtooPt) pa(t
—
At0Pt+2aot0 Pt), and pa(t—
At0Pt+2aotoPt). Let the corresponding three spoofing detec-
tion thresholds be called ytha, ythb, and yth,. The final
detection threshold was then chosen to be yth=min(ytha,ythb,
yth,), which is consistent with the philosophy of taking a
worst-case approach.
The worst-case probability of missed detection was cal-
culated in a similar ad hoc manner. Suppose that the corre-
sponding spoofed means and standard deviations for the
Ir!
spoofing detection calculations and analyses. The general
case offers benefits as well. One benefit is an improved
ability to discern when only a subset of signals are being
spoofed. Another benefit is an improved spoofing detection
5 power with fewer signals. As useful by-product is a coarse
3-axis attitude solution. For these reasons, a designer might
want to implement a 2-D or 3-D articulation system.
The present section develops the rudiments of a spoofing
detection test for this situation in the case of an unknown
10 attitude but a known articulation amplitude. Analysis strat-
egies for statistical design of the detection threshold and
computation of the missed-detection probability are sug-
gested but not fully developed. Generalizations to other
interesting cases are omitted, e.g., known attitude or
15 unknown attitude plus unknown amplitude scaling.
A. High-Pass Filtering via Linear Least-Squares Estima-
tion
A modified form of carrier-phase measurement high-pass
filtering is needed to remove the low-frequency effects of
20 unknown UE motion and clock drift. The high-pass filter
calculations solve a modified version of the least-squares
problem in Eq. (16). Instead of including the unknown
vector dot product (i~Tra, the modified problem includes the
unknown vector bx=A ', where the unit direction vector ix is
25 ? in the unspoofed case and i P in the spoofed case. Thus, bx
is the unit direction vector from the signal source to the
receiver as measured in the same coordinate system that is
used to define the antenna articulation time history ba(t).
Using the newly defined bx direction vector in either Eq.
30 (9) or Eq. (13), the carrier-phase time history model for thejth GNSS satellite becomes:
1 0 0 
—Tba(Tm;dl)
1 (Tmid2 — Tmidl)
1 2 27!
_T 
b(Tmid2)
ppJYD
D~1
nj22(Tmid2—Tmidl) a
Y1
1 (Tmid3 — Tmidl) 2(Tmid3—Tmidl)2 —2"ba (Tmid3)
+ 1n~322
.
1 (TmidNj — Tmidl)
1 2
2(T midNj — Tmidl)
2,7
— ba ('j idNj)
J
-0 N
J
above three time offsets have been calculated using the
relevant equations from Section IV, V, or VI and suppose
that the resulting values are, respectively, yPa, yPb, y Pc,
ayPa, ayPb, and ayP,. Then the worst-case probability of
false alarm is approximated as:
PMOwc= 
1 e 
1
~2dY (94)
27 PMD—
where
~(Yrh — Y,,Po (Yrh — Y,,,b (Yrh —Y, (95)
JPMD— = nlln
Cy,pp C-y,pb Cy,y,
VIII. Spoofing Detection with 2- and 3-Dimensional
Antenna Articulations
The present section develops a spoofing hypothesis test in
the case of general 2-D or 3-D articulation motion of the
antenna. This differs from the tests in Sections IV-VI, which
deal with the case of uni-axial motion defined in Eq. (2). The
general case is more complicated, both in terms of hardware
implementation of the articulations and in terms of the
(96)
45 One such system of equations applies for each satellite
j=1, ... , L.
As for the uni-axial ease, high-pass filtering in this case
So 
starts with a QR factorization of a re-scaled version of the
coefficient matrix on the right-hand side of Eq. (96):
55
Ril Rig Ri3 Ri4 Ri5 Ri6
0 R22 R23 RJ24 RJ25 RJ26
0 0 R33 R34 R35 R36
60 Qi 0 0 0 R44 R45 R46
0 0 0 0 R55 Ri6
0 0 0 0 0 R66
0 0 0 0 0 0
65
(97)
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-continued
1 0 0 
—Tba(Tmidl)
1 (Tmid2 — Tmidl) 2(Tmid2 — Tmidl)2 — ba (Tmid2)
1 (Tmid3 — Tmidl) 2 (Tmid3 — Tmidl)2 — 2" ba (Tm03)
1 (TmidNj — Tmidl) 2(T midNj _4 
)2
— Tba (T midNj)
46
find: A (99a)
to minimize:
5
10
~c1 (99b)
J_p3D(A) = 
Zu 
[R3DVj —
Z3D]
T [R3DAY' — Z3D]
j=1
subject to: ATA=I (99c)
where the N.-by-6 matrix on the right-hand side of this The problem in Eqs. (99a)-(99c) constitutes a batch
equation is the input to the QR factorization. The Nj-by-Nj 15 maximum likelihood attitude estimation problem because
orthonormal matrix q along with the R,i , R,2 , R,3 , ... , 7 o p3D(A) is the negative natural logarithm of the prob-
R66. elements of the corresponding upper-triangular matrix ability density p(z3D11 ... , z3DLIA, Ho)/w, where w is its
are the factorization's outputs. The corresponding opera- normalization constant. The constraint in Eq. (99c) is a
tions on the carrier-phase time history and the phase noise 20 symmetric 3-by-3 matrix constraint. Thus, it has only 6
time history are still defined by Eq. (18), even though the independent elements. The remaining unconstrained ele-
actual Q' as computed in Eq. (97) will differ from what ments of A are its 3 independent attitude parameters, e.g.,
roll, pitch, and yaw.
would have been computed had Eq. (17) been used for a
uni-axial antenna articulation case. The actual values of A helpful tool for solving the problem in Eq. (99a)-(99c)
some of the Rm i coefficients will also differ, especially for 25 
is the attitude quaternion q. It is a unit-normalized 4-element
vector that can parameterize the attitude. It can be used to
n>_4. compute the direction cosines matrix A=A(q). Using this
parameterization, the attitude estimation problem becomes
It is helpful to collect the Rm' and zm terms for all m and
n in the range 4 to 6 into a single matrix vector pair: 30
R~ R45 R46 (98)
R3D = 0 R55 R56 and 35
0 0 R66
Zq
Z3D = Z5
40
Z6
These terms define the 4t''-6t'' rows of the transformed
version of Eq. (96), the version that results from multipli- 45
cation of the equation on both sides by (Q)TV. These 3
find: q
to minimize:
(100a)
~c1 (100b)
J,—,p3D(Q) = 
Z , 
[R3DA(q)~ — Z3D1T ~R3DA(q)YJ — Z3D1
j=1
subject to: qTq=1 (100c)
This transformation reduces the problem to one of nonlinear
constrained optimization involving 4 unknowns and a single
scalar equality constraint.
transformed equations are the only ones that are relevant to A constrained implementation of Newton's method could
spoofing detection with general 3-D antenna articulation be used to solve the problem in Eqs. (100a)-(100c). It would
a
motion. The 1-3" transformed equations serve only to deter- be helpful to start the Newton procedure with a good first
mine the estimates of the auxiliary low-pass-filter param- 50 guess. A reasonable first guess could be determined by
eters ao, pi , and Rz . They produce no effects on any 
solving a related problem
sensible spoofing detection statistic, regardless of whether
these three parameters are removed from the problem via
optimization or via integration over all possibilities. All 55
equations beyond the Wh produce only residual errors that
are the same for the unspoofed and spoofed cases. Therefore,
they do not affect any sensible spoofing detection test either.
B. Calculation of a Spoofing Detection Statistic Based on 60
Attitude Estimation
If one assumes that the attitude A is unknown, then a
sensible spoofing detection test estimates the 3-by-3 ortho-
normal A matrix for the non-spoofed case, and it estimates 65
b P=AFP for the spoofed case. The non-spoofed optimal
attitude estimation problem takes the form:
find: q (101a)
to minimize:
r ( )
Jnon,,p3D(i) 
— 2 Y,wiLbopr — A(i)Y'~T ~bwr — A(i),
j]
j=1
subject to: qTq=1 (101c)
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where each 3-by-1 unit-direction vector boP' for j=1, ... , L
is the solution to the following estimation problem:
find: P (102a)
to minimize:
0-3D, 0 0
R3 
1 (104)
D
5 U3D
0
0
0
-3Db
0
0
0
R3D,
0 V D =
2
R3D
R3D
0 0 0 R 
j 1 T (102b) to and using the following transformation of non-homo eJj3D(b )= Z[R3Db — Z3D] [R3Db — z3D] g g g
neous terms.
subject to: (P)Tbi=1 (102c)
Thus, the suggested first-guess procedure involves solving L
problems of the type defined in Eqs. (102a)-(102c) followed
by solution of the problem in Eqs. (101a)-(101c).
This multi-step approach to generating a first guess for the
problem in Eqs. (100a)-(100c) may seem complicated, but
the extra effort can be worthwhile. The L bP' solutions each
can be computed in closed form by using a singular value
decomposition of the 3-by-3 R3D matrix followed by solu-
tion of a 6t''-order polynomial for the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the constraint in Eq. (102c). This is essen-
tially the same set of operations that are implemented in Eqs.
(41)-(47) in order to solve the ra estimation problem in Eqs.
(40a)-(40c). Of course, each of these problems must have a
unique solution in order to be useful for setting up the
problem in Eqs. (101a)-(101c).
The problem in Eqs. (101a)-(101c) also can be solved in
closed form by computing the eigenvalues and associated
eigenvectors of a 4-by-4 symmetric matrix. The problem in
Eqs. (101a)-(101c) is the classic Wahba problem of attitude
determination. The eigenvalue-based solution method is
known as the q-method. The positive weights w' for j=1, . .
. , L in Eq. (101b) should be chosen to be roughly propor-
tional to the inverse variance of the directional accuracy of
the corresponding bP' estimate from Eqs. (102a)-(102c).
This can be computed from the inverse of the Hessian of the
Lagrangian function associated with the optimal solution to
Eqs. (102a)-(102c) after projection of that Hessian into the
2-dimensional tangent space of the normalization constraint.
Consider now the spoofed case with general ba(t) antenna
articulation motion. In this situation, the full attitude is not
observable because the signals all come from a single
unknown direction. Therefore, the relevant free parameter in
the model is bP. A useful detection statistic can be devel-
oped if one estimates this quantity by solving the following
problem
find: b P (103a)
to minimize:
1 c T (103b)
J,,,3D(b ) = 2 , [R3D —Z3D] [Rj3Db —Z3Dj=1
subject to: (b P)Tb P=1 (103c)
This problem can be solved in closed form using the
following singular decomposition
Z3D 
(105)
15 
Z3Da 2
Z3D
Z3D6 T 3
— 
U
Z3D
Z3D,
Z3D,
20 Z3D
One performs analogous operations to those in Eqs. (43)-
(47) that solve the similar problem in Eqs. (40a)-(40c).
25 
Suppose that the resulting solution is called bPt P.
Note: the case of planar articulation presents special
challenges to these optimization problems. It is the case of
purely 2-dimensional ba(t) motion. Its challenges are the
possibility of there being two globally optimum solutions for
30 the attitude A in Eqs. (99a)-(99c) and the certainty of there
being two globally optimal solutions for the spoofing direc-
tion b P in Eqs. (103a)-(103c). The solution pairs will map to
each other via reflections through the plane of the ba(t)
motion. This happens because all of the 3-by-3 matrices
35 R3DJ are rank 2. This condition causes each of the b'
optimization problems in Eqs. (102a)-(102c) to have 2
globally optimal solutions, and it causes a3Dc in Eq. (104) to
be 0, giving rise to the two bP solutions. If there are L=3 or
more signals and if their ? vectors are not all coplanar, which
40 is the case for non-infinite Geometric Dilution of Precision
(GDOP), then the ambiguities of the bP' vectors should be
resolvable by the following technique: One chooses the bP'
vectors that approximately match the dot products of all
45 
pairs of bP' vectors with the corresponding ? dot products
and that approximately match the scalar triple products of all
trios of bP' vectors with corresponding ? scalar triple
products. These disambiguated bP' vectors can be used in
the approximate q optimization problem in Eqs. (101a)-
50 (101c) in order to generate a first guess for the exact problem
in Eqs. (100a)-(100c). The solution to this latter problem
should be unique in this case.
Unfortunately, there is no similar method to resolve the
bP ambiguity. Fortunately, the ambiguity likely does not
55 need resolution because the global minimum Eq.-(103b)
costs of the true and false bP values will be the same and
will yield identical values for the spoofing detection statistic
There is another possible way to resolve the ambiguities
60 caused by 2-dimensional ba(t) articulations. It relies on a
consideration of the gain pattern of the receiver's GPS
antenna. Typical gain patterns are hemispherical or nar-
rower. Normally, only one of the two global solutions for
any givenbP' orfor VP will correspond to a signal reception
65 direction that lies in a reasonable region of the antenna's
gain pattern. Note, however, that this may not be the case for
a poor combination of ba(t) motion and gain pattern. There-
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fore, it may behoove the system designer to consider this
issue when designing the articulation system.
Given the optimal solution A P, to the attitude determi-
nation problem in Eqs. (99a)-(99c), or equivalently, the qpt
solution of Eqs. (100a)-(100c), and given the solution bPt P
to the spoofer direction determination problem in Eqs.
(103a)-(103c), a sensible spoofing detection statistic is:
1'=JPan(b PrP)-J o„ Pan(A Pr)=JPan(b Pr P)-J„o„ Pan
(q P) (106)
A sensible spoofing detection test selects a threshold value
yth and determines that no spoofing has occurred if y>_yth. A
spoofing attack is declared, however, if y<yth. As in all other
tests defined herein, this test makes sense because 7P3D
(bPt P) will tend to be large in the non-spoofed case due to
the poor fit of its underlying spoofed signal model to the
non-spoofed data. The cost 7 o p3D(Apt), or the equivalent
quantity Tnon,3D(gopt)1 will tend to be small due to the
reasonableness of its model. Therefore, y will tend to be a
large positive number in the absence of spoofing. Under a
spoofing attack, however, 7p3D(bPtP) will be small due to
a good fit between its model and the carrier-phase data,
while 7 o p3D(APt) and the equivalent T non,3D(gopt) will
tend to be large, and y will tend to be a negative number of
large magnitude. A value of yth in the vicinity of 0 should
suffice to detect spoofing attacks with a low probability of
false alarm and a low probability of missed detection. This
test will not be an optimal Neyman-Pearson test due to its
use of the optimized values Apt and bPt P instead of
integration over all possible values. This test is likely to be
nearly as powerful as the optimal test, however, due to the
efficacy of optimization as a proxy for integration.
Although the specifics ofthe detection statistic calculation
change for 2D and 3D antenna motion, the basic spoofing
detection principle remains the same. During a spoofing
attack, there is no geometric diversity of the direction of
arrival of the L signals. Therefore, to within measurement
error, all of the carrier phase variations caused by the ba(t)
motion will be identical for all L satellites. When there is no
spoofing, however, the L different satellites will, in general,
exhibit L distinct carrier-phase responses to the ba(t) motion.
Successful spoofing detection is a matter of distinguishing
between these two situations. The difference of carrier-
phase-model fits between the spoofed and non-spoofed
assumptions, as embodied in Eq. (106) and in similar
equations herein, represents a good mechanization for com-
paring the relative sameness vs. diversity of the carrier phase
responses to ba(t).
C. Design of Spoofing Detection Threshold and Analysis
of Probabilities, Unknown Attitude and General 3D Articu-
lation
The spoofing detection test for the case of general 3D
antenna articulations requires some design and analysis. The
spoofing detection threshold yth must be chosen to give a
particular false-alarm probability, and the resulting probabil-
ity of missed detection must be analyzed. For the sake of
brevity, the required analyses are not carried out here.
Instead, general approaches are defined that could be used to
carry out the analyses.
The first step in the design and analysis is to characterize
the non-spoofed and spoofed probability density, functions
for the detection statistic y, p(ylA, Ho) and p(y1bP,H1). A
good first step in deriving these functions is to express y as
a function of the (3L)-by-1 dimensional noise vector v3D
[n e n e n.1;  n 
2i 
n 
2i 
n 
2i 
n 
3i 
n 
3i 
n 
3. 
e n4; n5';  n 'l•4 5 4 5 6 4 5 6~ 4 6
The noise terms n4 ns , and n6 are the ones calculated in the
alternate version of Eq. (18) that is associated with the
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high-pass-filter QR factorization for the 3D problem given
in Eq. (97). This first step will probably require approxima-
tion to yield a result that is valid only to second order in v3D•
The resulting equations will be 3D analogs of Eqs. (49) and
5 (53) that look somewhat similar. The main differences will
lie in the terms that are quadratic forms in v3D. In Eqs. (49)
and (53), the quadratic form in v involves a symmetric
weighting matrix that is the difference between a projection
matrix onto a 2D subspace, or nearly so, and a projection
io matrix onto a 1 D subspace. In the new equations, the matrix
difference will be between a projection matrix onto a 3D
subspace, or nearly so, and a projection matrix onto a 2D
subspace, or nearly so.
The most important feature of the resulting y formulas in
15 terms of v3D is that they will still be dominated by Gaussian
terms. Therefore, Gaussian approximations can be devel-
oped for p(ylA, Ho) and p(ylbP,H1).
Given p(ylA, Ho), the design ofyth will proceed similarly
to the design used in Subsection V.C. Given a worst-case
20 probability of false alarm a_,, a corresponding worst-case
attitude A_ will be estimated, and the corresponding thresh-
old yth will be determined using oL_, and p(ylA_,,Ho) in a
standard calculation. Note that the optimization problem
used to determine A_ will be somewhat more complicated
25 than the corresponding problems for the case of 1 D antenna
articulation motion. It may be advisable to solve for an
equivalent worst-case true attitude quaternion qw, and then
use that to compute A_, A(q_J. Such an approach will
reduce the dimensionality of the worst-case optimization
30 problem from 9 to 4 while reducing the number of nonlinear
equality constraints from 6 to 1.
Given yth and p(ylbP,H1), a worst-case false-alarm prob-
ability will be computable, similar to what has been done in
Subsection VC for the unknown attitude case with 1D
35 articulation motion. This will involve an optimization prob-
lem to determine the worst-case spoofing direction vector
b_, P. It will be an equality-constrained optimization that
enforces (bw, P)Tbw, P=1.
IX. Spoofing Detection Results using Data From Truth-
40 Model Simulations And From Live-Signal Tests
The spoofing detection techniques of Sections IV-VI have
been tested using truth-model simulation data. The tech-
nique of Section VI, coupled with the time phasing estima-
tion of Section VII, has also been tested using live-signal
45 data. All of these tests involve simple 1-dimensional ba(t)
articulation motion. No tests have yet been implement for
general 3D antenna articulation. All of the tests have worked
with the GPS Ll C/A-code signal, which has a nominal
carrier frequency of f,1=1575.42x106 Hz and a nominal
50 wavelength of X l—c/fL1-0.190294 m. All of these tests
exhibit very good detection power and small probabilities of
false alarm when using peak-to-peak antenna deflections in
the range 4-6 cm and detection intervals in the range 0.125
to 0.5 sec. Representative test results are described in this
55 section.
A. Design of Monte-Carlo Truth-Model Simulation Tests
Two truth-model simulations have been developed, one to
simulate the non-spoofed beat carrier phase time histories, as
modeled by Eq. (10), and another to simulate the spoofed
6o beat carrier phase histories, as per Eq. (15). Each simulation
has used truth values of the quadratic polynomial low-pass
filter nuisance parameters Ro , R1', and Rz for GPS satellites
j=1, ... , L. It also has used a truth articulation direction ra
and a truth articulation amplitude time history pa(t). The
65 non-spoofed simulations have used truth directions from the
satellites to the defended receiver ? for j=1, ... , L, but the
spoofed simulations have used only a truth value for the
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spoofer-to-receiver unit direction vector FP. Each simulation
has generated simulated carrier phase measurements ~ i at
the truth sample times tim=dk for k=1, Nj and
j=1, ... , L. Each such measurement has been corrupted by
zero-mean Gaussian discrete-time white noise n~k sampled 5
using a random number generator. The standard deviation &
of the jth satellite signal's noise sequence has been dictated
by its carrier-to-noise ratio C/No, as modeled in Eq. (11).
For each spoofing detection test, the test calculations have
been supplied with the following data from the truth-model 10
simulation: ~ i and T_, i for k=1, ... , Nj and j=1, ... , L,
pa jt), f for j=1, ... , L, and (' for j=1, ... , L. In all
non-spoofed cases, the supplied ? direction vectors have
equaled the truth vectors that have been used in the corre- 15
sponding truth-model simulation. In all spoofed cases, the
supplied ? direction vectors are a reasonable fictitious set
that the spoofer has led the victim receiver to believe as
being the directions from actual satellites.
Additional data supplied to the spoofing detection test 20
have varied with the test. In the case of the known-attitude/
known-amplitude tests of Section IV, the articulation direc-
tion vector ra also has been supplied to the detection test
calculations, the same one as has been used in the truth-
model simulation. For both the known-attitude/known-am- 25
plitude test of Section IV and the unknown-attitude/known-
amplitude test of Section V, the supplied nominal
articulation amplitude time history p, ,,_(t) has equaled the
truth pa(t) that has been used in the simulation. For the
unknown-attitude/unknown-amplitude test of Section VI, 30
however, the supplied value of p, ,,_(t) has equaled pa(t)/a,
where pa(t) is the truth time history and the value a>_1 is the
truth amplitude rescaling factor. In no spoofed case has the
spoofer direction FP been supplied to the spoofing detection
calculations. 35
In each test scenario, the truth-model simulation has been
run in a Monte-Carlo mode: Thousands of trials have been
run with the same input parameters but with different
random number seeds to generate different white-noise
sequences n,,k for k=1, ... , Nj and j=1, .... L. A spoofing 40
detection statistic has been computed for each set of simu-
lated data, and histograms of the statistic have been plotted.
Also plotted have been the spoofing detection threshold and
the predicted theoretical probability density functions of the
spoofing detection statistic for the non-spoofed and spoofed 45
conditions. These plots characterize the power of the test and
the accuracy of the Gaussian approximations used to design
and analyze the various detection scenarios.
The tests that have been run have concentrated on cases
that use L=6 GPS satellite signals with a distribution of ? 50
direction vectors that yields a GDOP of 3.5. The modeled
carrier-to-noise ratios range from 38.2 dB-Hz to 44.0 dB-Hz.
These are somewhat conservative assumptions about the
number of available satellites, their geometric dilution of
precision, and their signal strengths. This conservatism 55
translates into less detection power for a given false-alarm
probability than would be available in spoofing detection
tests that had more satellites, a better GDOP, or stronger
signals.
Additional common features of the simulation cases have 60
been the form of the pa(t) articulation time history, the
duration of the detection data batch, and the sample rate.
pa(t) is always an 8 Hz sine wave, and the detection covers
one full period of its oscillation. Thus, the total detection
interval is 0.125 sec. The accumulation period AT_j 0.001 65
see has been used so that each satellite contributes N 125
carrier-phase measurements to each detection test.
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The decision to use one full period of a sine wave, starting
at zero phase and ending at a phase of 27t, guarantees a
significant residual signal component after the high-pass
filtering associated with the QR factorization in Eq. (17).
This is true because a full period of a sine wave cannot be
fit well by the quadratic polynomial that is parameterized by
its 
P 
 
, 
P 
 
, and (3z 1 coefficients. The presence of significant
residual articulation signal after high-pass filtering is impor-
tant to achieving a good detection power.
The peak-to-peak pa(t) deflections have been varied from
4.76 cm to 5.85 cm. The lower number is exactly a quarter
of a carrier wavelength. The higher number is about 31% of
a wavelength. As per Eq. (11), C/No 38.2 dB-Hz at a 1000
Hz accumulation frequency translates into a carrier phase
measurement error standard deviation of c'-0.275 rad
(0.0438 cycles). This standard deviation is no greater than
17.5% of the phase effect of the peak-to-peak antenna
motion. Therefore, the articulation motion should be clearly
discernable in the data.
Several truth values have been used for the articulation
direction vector ra and for the spoofer direction vector ?P. In
some cases, random values have been chosen for these
directions. In other cases, worst-case values have been
chosen as the truth values, That is, the truths sometimes has
been chosen to equal the solution to the worst-case direction
problem in Eqs. (59a)-(59c) for the situation of known
amplitude and unknown attitude. Similarly, i'P sometimes
has been chosen so that rl=(?P) ra equals the solution to the
worst-case dot product problem in Eqs. (61 a)-(61c).
B. Monte-Carlo Simulation Test Results
The Monte-Carlo simulation results for a typical spoofing
detection test are shown in FIG. 5. It shows y detection
statistic histograms for 10000 Monte-Carlo simulations of a
non-spoofed case and 10000 other Monte-Carlo simulations
of the corresponding spoofed case for an unknown-attitude/
known-amplitude spoofing detection test. This is the test
developed in Section V. Also shown are the spoofing detec-
tion threshold for a worst-case false alarm probability of
OL_, 10-s along with the theoretical non-spoofed and
spoofed probability density functions for y. Note that the
non-spoofed and spoofed cases both use the same pa(t)
articulation time history and the same values of ? for
j=1, ... , L for all of their tests. The peak-to-peak antenna
deflections in pa(t) are 4.76 cm, i.e., exactly a quarter of the
nominal Ll wavelength. All 10000 non-spoofed cases use
the same truth value of ra, and all 10000 spoofed cases use
the same truth value of rl=(?P) ra.
It is clear from FIG. 5 that the spoofing detection test
correctly classified all 10000 non-spoofed cases and all
10000 spoofed cases. It is also clear that the theoretical and
Monte-Carlo probability density functions are in good
agreement. This agreement confirms the reasonableness of
the Gaussian approximations of p(y1ra,H0) and p(ylrq,Hj.
The truth values of ra and rl that have been used to
generate the data in FIG. 5 are not the worst-case values for
the given situation. This is evidenced by two facts: The
actual probability of false alarm is a=1.7x10-9<0Lw
,_ 10-5,
and the actual probability of missed detection is PmD l.Ix
10-6<PNmw
,—
 
1.2x10-s. Even if ra and rl had taken on their
worst-case values, the resulting detection test still would
have been very powerful.
Another typical case is shown in FIG. 6. This case is
similar in many respects to that of FIG. 5, except for three
points: First, it is for the unknown-attitude/unknown-ampli-
tude case. Second, its truth values of ra=ara and of rl=a(FP)ra
are the worst-case values for the given parameters of this
problem. Third, the pa(t) articulation time history has a
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slightly larger peak-to-peak deflection, 5.77 cm, which is
30.3% of the nominal LI carrier wavelength. Note that the
worst-case value of a is 1, i.e., the smallest possible value,
so that raffia.
The results for the unknown-attitude/unknown-amplitude
test in FIG. 6 are very good, and they are comparable to
those in FIG. 5. The probability of false alarm is only
OL-OL , 10-7, and the probability of missed detection is only
PmD PmDw,- 1.6x10-7. Note that the improved worst-case
values for FIG. 6's results vs. those of FIG. 5 are likely due
to the slightly larger amplitude of the antenna articulations.
All of the other Monte-Carlo tests have produced similar
good results. The largest values of aw, and PMDw, have been,
respectively, 3.0x10-5 and 2.8x10-5. These both occurred
on the smallest-amplitude case, a case with unknown-atti-
tude/unknown-amplitude and with a p, ,,_(t) peak-to-peak
articulation of only 4.52 cm. Even these largest probabilities
are very small. They are characteristic of reliable tests. All
of the tests used peak-to-peak antenna motion of less than 6
cm and a detection interval of 0.125 seconds. These are very
powerful tests for a compact system, and they detect spoof-
ing attacks quickly.
C. Test Scenarios that use Live Data
Three sets of test have been conducted using live data. All
of these tests have been conducted using the prototype
articulation system shown in FIG. 3. Therefore, it has been
necessary to use the unknown-attitude/unknown-amplitude
spoofing detection test of Section VI along with the At, time
phasing estimation pre-processing calculations that are
described in Section VII.
Two of the test sets included spoofing or spoofing-like
signals. A spoofing-like signal has been generated for one set
of tests by receiving GPS signals using an outdoor antenna,
amplifying them, and re-radiating them indoors in an
anechoic chamber. Although not true spoofing, this configu-
ration has the same signal-in-space geometry that is
exploited by the present spoofing detection techniques: All
of the signals come from the common direction FP. In this
case, the direction points from the re-radiating antenna to the
defended receiver's articulating antenna, which is also
inside the anechoic chamber. The particular anechoic cham-
ber that has been used is a NASA facility in Wallops Island,
Va. This facility has permission to re-radiate GPS signals
inside the chamber because it provides sufficient shielding to
prevent RE energy from radiating outside of the chamber.
The tests in this facility were conducted on Apr. 26, 2012.
A true spoofing signal has been generated using an
advanced version of the spoofer described in Humphreys, T.
E., Ledvina, B. M., Psiaki, M. L., O'Hanlon, B., and
Kintner, P. M., Jr., "Assessing the Spoofing Threat: Devel-
opment of a Portable GPS Civilian Spoofer," Proc. ION
GNSS 2008, Sept. 16-19, 2008, Savannah, Ga. and in
Humphreys, T. E., Kintner, P. M., Jr., Psiaki, M. L., Ledvina,
B. M., and O'Hanlon, B. W., "Assessing the Spoofing
Threat," GPS World, Vol. 20, No. 1, January 2009, pp.
28-38. It was authorized to broadcast live spoofing signals
on the night of Jun. 19-20, 2012 at White Sands Missile
Range, N. Mex. (WSMR). These broadcasts were conducted
as part of a special series of GPS integrity tests that had been
arranged by the Department of Homeland Security. The
prototype spoofing detection system was brought to WSMR
and tested against some of the spoofing attacks that were
initiated that night. It was located in the region where the
spoofer was targeting victims so that the spoofed signals
would look realistic. The prototype system was also tested
that same night during quite times when the spoofer was
turned off.
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The third set of tests were for a typical non-spoofed case
in Ithaca, N.Y. This test was conducted on top of a tall
building on the campus of Cornell University on May 3,
2012. Thus, there were two independent sets of data under
5 spoofing or spoofing-like conditions and two other indepen-
dent sets of data under non-spoofed conditions.
Purely for the sake of ease of implementation, the proto-
type system did all of its GPS signal processing and spoofing
detection calculations in a post-processing mode. The
10 
antenna motion was activated by using an attached string to
cause an initial deflection of the cantilevered-beam antenna
mount. Prior to initiating motion, a GPS digital storage
receiver started operation to record the entire LI signal
15 bandwidth. The stored RE data were later processed on a
work station using a C-language software GPS receiver in
order to produce the raw beat carrier phase observables ~ i
for k=1, ... , Nj and j=1, ... , L. The software receiver also
produced raw signal accumulations, which were used in
20 order to deduce each carrier-to-noise ratio (C/NOy for pur-
poses of computing carrier-phase measurement standard
deviation o', as in Eq. (11). All of the beat carrier phase
measurements used a nominal accumulation interval of
AT.. gP.01 sec. That is, carrier phase was sampled at 100
25 Hz.
After generation by the software receiver, the raw ~k
measurements were input to the spoofing detection signal
processing calculations. These calculations included the
cycle-slip repair described in Subsection IILA, the high-pass
30 filtering calculations in Eqs. (17) and (18) of Section IVB,
the At, estimation calculations of Subsection VILA, and the
spoofing detection calculations of Section VI.
An additional auxiliary estimation problem had to be
solved prior to performing the spoofing detection calcula-
35 tions: The shape of the pa om(t) articulation profile had to be
estimated. It was known a priori from the vibration theory of
linear structures that a good approximation of this profile
would be a decaying sinusoid of the form
40 p .... (t—Ato)=paoe ~- (=—A`o)sin [(t—Ato)w,~1, _ ll (107)
where pao is the initial amplitude, 
~ 
is the damping ratio, w
is the undamped natural frequency, and At, is the time
phasing variable defined in Section VII. Unfortunately, these
quantities were not known ahead of time. In order to do
45 spoofing detection, it was necessary to have good estimates
of 
~ 
and w along with a coarse estimate of At, and a lower
bound for pao.
Therefore, a pre-processing estimation problem has been
solved to determine ~, w and Ato. It minimizes the follow-
50 ing modified version of the Ato estimation cost function from
Eq. (90):
dsh,e(S, wn, AtO) = (108)
55
1 r Ato 12 1 T
)fjIl J
2 O-Ato, 2j=1
60 where j'(Ato; ~, w) is the same function that is defined by
Eqs. (91b) & (92b), but with p jt-Ato) in Eq. (92b) replaced
by pa om(t-Ato) from Eq. (107). Note that this cost function
does not depend on the unknown articulation amplitude pao
because the d'(Ato; ~, w) normalization calculations in Eq.
65 (91b) remove the dependence on pao. The corresponding
d'(Ato; ~, w)[&(Ato; ~, w )]' term in Eq. (108) effectively
estimates the phase time history scaling quantities
55
t~~T Ya/~a0
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for j=1, ... ,Las independent unknowns and removes them
from the problem. The minimization of 7sh Pe(~,w,,,Ato)
starts with reasonable first guesses of ~, w,,, and Ato as
determined by operator inspection of the corresponding ~k
VS. T_idk time histories, and it iterates to compute improved
estimates using Newton's method.
Typical detrended carrier-phase data used in the estima-
tion of ~, w,,, and Ato appear in FIG. 7. These data come from
one of the non-spoofed detection tests conducted at WSMR.
The initial string pull starts at t-0.3 sec. The release of the
string and the start of the damped oscillations occur as t=2.2
sec. It is obvious that the subsequent carrier phase oscilla-
tions during the interval from t=2.2 sec to t=4 sec are
modeled reasonably well by the decaying sinusoid in Eq.
(107). In one curve fitting scenario, all of the data from
t=2.35 sec to i=3.63 sec were used, which constitutes 3 full
cycles of the decaying oscillations. The resulting estimates
of the damping ratio and the undamped natural frequency
are 
~
-0.0581 and w,-14.8405 rad/sec. This gives a damped
period of 0.4241 sec. The damping ratios and undamped
natural frequencies estimated for all the various data sets of
the prototype system span the ranges 
~
-0.0137 to 0.1164
and w,-10.9982 to 15.2119 rad/sec. The lower frequency
cases in the range w,-10.9982 to 11.9545 rad/sec occurred
in the April and May tests in Wallops Island and Ithaca. The
higher frequency cases in the range co,-14.7732 to 15.2119
rad/sec all occurred at WSMR. This frequency jump was the
result of a change in the cantilever beam conditions that
caused a slight stiffening of its effective spring constant. The
highest damping ratios, in the range 
~
-0.0751 to 0.1164,
correspond to WSMR cases that use only the last one or two
oscillation periods before the oscillations stop altogether,
e.g., between t=3 and t=3.85 sec in FIG. 7. The larger
effective damping ratios for lower amplitude oscillations
presumably are due to the presence of nonlinear static
friction in the system. This indicates that spoofing detection
tests conducted using the later oscillations of the prototype
system might not perform exactly as modeled because the
nonlinear friction effects become more important, and they
are not modeled as well by the decaying sinusoidal time
history in Eq. (107).
The carrier phase time histories in FIG. 7 serve to
illustrate the present teachings' means of spoofing detection.
It is obvious from this figure that all of the L=8 satellite
signals exhibit similar decaying sinusoid time histories with
the same phase, except for a possible sign change. This is
exactly what is predicted by the 1-dimensional non-spoofed
carrier phase model in Eq. (10). Presumably the differing
signs and amplitudes of the signals are explainable in terms
of the differing values of (?)T ra for some reasonable esti-
mate of ra. In all of the spoofed cases, however, the
detrended decaying sinusoids for the different signals all
have the same amplitude and sign because the (i P)Tra term
in Eq. (15) is the same for all signals. This situation is shown
in FIG. 8 for a spoofed case recorded at WSMR.
The task of the spoofing detection calculation is to test
whether sameness is the best model or whether a better
model is one of differences. The former explanation indi-
cates spoofing, but the latter indicates no spoofing. In the
latter case, however, these differences must be explainable in
terms of differing (i') ra values for differing signal indices j
and for some reasonable ra estimate. The other carrier-phase-
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based spoofing detection tests that have been proposed give
no indication that one can detect GNSS spoofing by exploit-
ing the obvious difference between the diversity of carrier
phase time histories in FIG. 7 and the uniformity in FIG. 8,
5 especially if the diversity in FIG. 7 correlates well with the
known antenna motions.
D. Results of Live-Data Tests
The live-data spoofing detection tests have all proved
successful. A total of 4 non-spoofed cases and 4 spoofed
io cases have been analyzed, and the correct decision about the
presence of spoofing has been reached in every case. All
cases have used the worst-case probability of false alarm
value OL_, 10-6, and the largest worst-case probability of
missed detection has been PmDw,- 1.6x106.
15 Peak-to-peak antenna deflections in the non-spoofed
cases, where they could be directly estimated, have ranged
from 4.01 cm (21% of X,,) to 13.55 cm (71% of X J. The
spoofed-case amplitudes have been appraised as having
been commensurate based on the known consistency of the
20 initial impulses, and the corresponding rl dot-product/am-
plitude estimates have been consistent with this range of
peak-to-peak amplitudes. The tests with the largest peak-to-
peak articulation amplitudes used data from the start of an
articulation time history, e.g., the first till oscillation periods
25 in FIGS. 7 and 8. The tests with the smallest amplitudes used
one of the last full oscillations, e.g., the oscillation starting
at 1=3.43 sec in FIG. 7 and the one starting at t=2.11 sec in
FIG. 8. A test using one of the later oscillations has been run
for each of the 8 cases, and the non-spoofed later oscillation
30 peak-to-peak amplitude estimates range from 4.01 cm 5.9
cm. The corresponding minimum peak-to-peak deflections,
as determined by the a>_1 amplitude constraint and the
p, ,,_(t) time histories, ranged from 2.86 cm to 4.21 cm.
Thus, the system can work effectively with small antenna
35 deflections.
Each test used approximately one period of the decaying
sinusoidal pa _(t), yielding detection intervals ranging
from 0.39 sec to 0.57 sec. The simulation test results of
Subsection IX.B imply that shorter intervals would have
40 sufficed had the articulation system been designed to vibrate
at a higher frequency.
The number of satellites available for the tests ranged
from L=6 to 9, and the corresponding GDOP values ranged
from 1.77 to 4.90. The carrier-to-noise ratios ranged from
45 C/No=30.6 to 51.3 dB-Hz, with the mean values over all the
satellites in a given test ranging from (C/NO)a g 39.3 to 47.3
dB-Hz. The power of the test is expected to increase with
increasing L, with increasing (C/NO), g, and with increasing
minimum peak-to-peak antenna deflection, and to decrease
50 with increasing GDOP. In fact, the weakest test, the one with
PmDw,- 1.6x10-6, had the minimum number of satellites of
any of the cases, L=6 satellites, and it had the second highest
GDOP, 4.35. Its (C/NO), g was 44.3 dB-Hz. It also had
almost the smallest minimum peak-to-peak deflection con-
55 straint as defined by its p, ,,_(t). The other case with L=6
satellites had almost the same (C/NO), g, 44.2 dB-Hz, a
larger minimum peak-to-peak deflection, 3.99 cm, and a
lower GDOP, 3.86. The larger minimum deflection and the
lower GDOP explain its lower PmDw,. The other case with
60 slightly higher GDOP, 4.90, had a larger number of satel-
lites, L=7, a larger (C/NO), g, 47.3, and a larger minimum
peak-to-peak deflection, 4.21 cm. These differences explain
its decreased PmDw,.
The detection results for a typical non-spoofed case are
65 shown in FIG. 9. The test was made at WSMR when the
spoofer was not broadcasting. This case corresponds to the
weakest detection of all 8 cases, both spoofed and non-
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spoofed, the one that yielded PmDw,— 1.6x10-6. The spoofing
detection statistic y is plotted along the horizontal axis. The
vertical black dashed line shows the actual computed value
of y from the GPS data. The vertical dash-dotted magenta
lines show the worst-case threshold values y, as computed 5
for the following three different estimates of Ato: to Pt,
Ato Pt+2aotoPt, and AtoPt 26otoPt, as per the analysis
described in Subsection VII.C. The left-most of these three
vertical lines constitutes the detection threshold. Given that
the three candidate thresholds lie virtually on top of each 10
other, the choice of the lowest is somewhat immaterial. The
vertical dashed black line lies very far to the right of the
three vertical dash-dotted magenta lines. Therefore, this
detection is clearly successful in ruling out a spoofing attack. 15
FIG. 9 also plots various relevant probability density
functions. Consistent with the analysis of Subsection VILC,
these are plotted in triplets, one for each of the elements of
the triplet of candidate Ato estimates: toPt, AtoPt+26oto Pt,
and AtoPt 26otoPt. The three dotted cyan probability den- 20
sity functions represent the worst-case non-spoofed situa-
tion, and the three dash-dotted red probability functions
represent the corresponding worst-case spoofed situations.
Obviously, there is sufficient separation between these sets
of probability density functions to yield a powerful detection 25
test, as evidenced by the ability to draw the dash-dotted
magenta detection thresholds in a way that clearly separates
the red and cyan distributions. Further confirmation of good
detection power is provided by the low worst-case prob-
abilities of false alarm and missed-detection. 30
The three dashed green curves are the non-spoofed p(y Ir„
Ho) probability density functions using the estimated value
of r, in place of the worst-case value. The solid blue curves
are the spoofed p(yl q,H,) probability density functions using
the estimated value of rl in place of the worst-case value. Of 35
course, the r, estimate used to generate the dashed green
curves has much more meaning than does the rl estimate
used to generate the solid blue curves because this is a
non-spoofed case. The important point of these latter prob-
ability density plots is that the actual y, the vertical dashed 40
black line, is believable as a sample from all three of the
dashed green probability density functions. This fact indi-
cates that the signal models used to generate the hypothesis
test calculations are reasonable.
FIG. 10 plots detection results for a typical spoofed case. 45
All of the definitions and line/curve colors are the same in
FIG. 10 as in FIG. 9. The only major difference is that the
vertical dashed black line plotted at the calculated detection
value y now lies far to the left of the 3 dash-dotted magenta
vertical lines, the three candidate y, detection threshold 50
values. The fact that y<y, by a wide margin indicates a very
reliable detection of the spoofing attack. The worst-case
spoofed and non-spoofed probability density functions are
widely separated, allowing the selection of a y, threshold
value that yields both a low worst-case probability of false 55
alarm and a low worst-case probability of missed detection.
The overlap between the vertical dashed black detection
statistic and the solid blue probability density functions
indicates the reasonableness of the spoofed hypothesis that
y is a sample from one of these 3 p(ylrgPt,HI) distributions. 60
Note that this case has L=6 GPS signals, (C/N0),,,g,=44.2
dB-Hz, GDOP=3.86, and a minimum peak-to-peak antenna
articulation of 3.99 cm.
In summary, the live-data tests of this system indicate
excellent performance. The correct situation of spoofing or 65
non-spoofing has been identified unambiguously in all cases
considered. Furthermore, small antenna motions, in the
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range 4-6 cm peak-to-peak, and short data batches, 0.57 sec
or less, yield very powerful spoofing detection tests.
X. Discussion of System Properties, Potential Enhance-
ments, and Merits Relative To IMU-Based Methods
A. Non-Detectable Spoofing Cases
There exist special cases in which some or all of the
present teachings' spoofing detection methods would not
work. The basic method relies on geometric diversity of the
terms
27r
— 
T 
W)'Akba(T idk)
in Eq. (8) for j=1, .. . , L for the non-spoofed case as
compared to lack of diversity in the term
(pp)T Alba(' idk)
in the spoofed case, Eq. (13). In perverse situations, how-
ever, the vectors ? may not have sufficient diversity. Of
course, if L=1, if there is only one available signal, then
there is no diversity, and this method fails. Even if L=2
GNSS satellites, however, the one-dimensional version of
this system lacks sufficient diversity. Recall that b,(t)=bap,
(t) when the articulations are 1-dimensional. In this case, it
is possible to find a vector r, ATb, that solves the non-
spoofed estimation problem in Eqs. (40a)-(40c) to yield a
low cost even during a spoofing attack. This solution will
satisfy (ri)Tra (r~)Tr, by lying in the plane exactly between
P and P. In fact, poor spoofing detection power will occur
in any case where there exists the possibility of finding an ra
such that all values of (?)Ti, for j=1, ... , L are equal or
nearly so. It is easy to show, however, that any such case
yields a very high GDOP, an infinite GDOP if (?)Ti, for
j=1, ... , L can be exactly equal for some choice of r,. A very
large GDOP, however, would preclude the spoofer from
fooling the victim into confidently computing a false posi-
tion/time solution. Therefore, it is unlikely that a near-
infinite GDOP case would occur in practice. Even if a
spoofer were to mount such an attack, the present teachings'
spoofing detection algorithm would realize that it was inca-
pable of discerning whether or not an attack was occurring:
It would not be able to achieve both a low false-alarm
probability and a low probability of missed detection.
B. Advantages of 2D and 3D Antenna Articulations
There are a two important advantages to using a version
of this spoofing detection method that employs 2D or full 3D
antenna articulations b,(t). One advantage occurs in the case
of a low number of signals. As mentioned in the preceding
subsection, spoofing detection will be impossible using the
present teachings' 1-dimensional techniques if L=2 avail-
able GNSS signals or if GDOP is infinite or very large. In the
case of 2-dimensional or 3-dimensional antenna articula-
tions, however, it becomes much easier to detect spoofing in
these situations.
The enhanced spoofing detection occurs because the
detection calculations can estimate individual b' unit direc-
tion vectors by solving the problem in Eqs. (102a)-(102c).
Without spoofing, the relative directions between the esti-
mated bP' vectors should be the same as the relative
directions between the corresponding known f vectors, to
within the estimation accuracies of the bP' vectors. The
sameness of the relative directions can be explored by
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comparing dot products between various pairs (b't, b Pty)
the corresponding pairs (r', r~) and by comparing scalar triple
products between non-coplanar trios (b P', bPtZ,b pt-) and
the corresponding trios (?, rt, rm). These dot products and
scalar triple products are directly comparable because they
are independent of the unknown coordinate frame rotation
that distinguishes b' from its corresponding F. Any signifi-
cant difference in dot products or scalar triple products
indicates a spoofing attack. Using this approach, an attack
should be detectable even when L=2 vectors if P and r2
differ sufficiently in their directions.
The use of 2D and 3D ba(t) articulations also can help
address the problem of partial spoofing, i.e., of spoofing only
some signals. In that case, the spoofer would almost cer-
tainly have to broadcast its signal from an i P direction which
differed from one or more of the spoofed F directions that the
spoofer had implied to the victim. The victim's solution of
Eqs. (102a)-(102c) would generate a corresponding bop' that
would equal Ai P instead of Air. This difference of directions
would be detected in dot-product or scalar-triple-product
comparisons that involved bop' on one side of the calcula-
tions and ? on the other side.
C. Impact of Multipath Errors
In theory, carrier-phase multipath has the potential to
impact the present teachings' spoofing detection in a nega-
tive manner. It is a well known fact that carrier-phase
multipath errors can be on the order of 0.5 cm or more and
that they can negatively impact the closely related technol-
ogy of GNSS-based attitude determination No explicit
analysis has been made of the potential impact of multipath
on this system. There is, however, strong experimental
evidence that the impacts are manageable.
In two of the three live-data tests of this system, signifi-
cant carrier-phase multipath effects have been evident. The
two tests in question are the non-spoofed tests in Ithaca, N.Y.
and the spoofed and non-spoofed tests at WSMR. The
indications of strong carrier-phase multipath consisted of
strong variations of the received signal power that were
highly correlated with the decaying sinusoidal antenna
articulation motions. Such variations are depicted in FIG.
11. This figure plots the amplitude time histories of the GPS
receiver's [Ipk; QPj prompt accumulation vectors that cor-
respond to the detrended carrier phase time histories in FIG.
7. It is clear from the figure that PRNs 04, 10, and 29, the
dash-dotted red curve, the dotted black curve, and the dotted
magenta curve, all show significant exponential decays that
correlate closely with the exponentially decaying carrier
phase time histories of FIG. 7. The largest zero-to-peak
amplitude variations of the dotted magenta curve equal 30%
of its nominal level.
The most reasonable explanation for the amplitude varia-
tions in FIG. 11 is that of alternating constructive and
destructive interference between the direct signal and a
significant multipath signal. One might postulate that varia-
tions in antenna gain pattern could have caused these
fluctuations. The actual rotations of the antenna gain pattern
were small, however, and it is not believable that the
resulting gain fluctuations along any fixed line-of-sight
could have been large enough to cause that oscillations
observed in FIG. 11.
The following fact further supports the multipath expla-
nation for the oscillations in FIG. 11: The anechoic chamber
data taken at NASA Wallops displayed no such amplitude
oscillations. This is exactly what one would expect if the
oscillations were caused by multipath because an anechoic
chamber has very low multipath.
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One would expect that the corresponding multipath-in-
duced carrier-phase variations would be commensurate in a
relative sense. Thus, the peak carrier phase multipath errors
for the dotted magenta curve, PRN 29, might be as large as
5 0.3 rad-0.048 cycles at the start of the antenna oscillations.
Fortunately, this level of multipath error is significantly
smaller than the beat carrier phase variations that were
caused by the antenna motion. As per FIG. 7, these were
about 0.6 cycles peak-to-peak for PRN 29 at the outset of the
io antenna vibrations.
None of the spoofing detection tests suffered any discern-
ible ill effects from the apparent presence of significant
multipath error. All of them produced reasonable detection
statistics, as evidenced in FIGS. 9 and 10 and in similar
15 figures for other cases.
The only apparent effect of multipath was an error in
estimated antenna articulation direction ra Pt r,,1jjr,,tjj.
For a non-spoofed test in Ithaca, N.Y. The prototype antenna
articulation system of FIG. 3 had been set up to produce an
20 ra articulation direction that was horizontal. The estimated
rapt, however, was tilted about 8 deg away from horizontal.
This apparent tilt may have been the result of carrier-phase
multipath. Fortunately, it did not adversely impact the detec-
tion technique's ability to rule out the possibility of a
25 spoofing attack. If the spoofing detection system placed an
optically opaque radome over the entire antenna and articu-
lation system, then the spoofer would be prevented from
obtaining this information.
D. Merits in Comparison to Existing IMU-Aided Spoof-
30 ing Detection Approaches
The system developed in the present teachings has some
similarities to IMU-based methods, but it has several advan-
tages over such methods. First, it can be implemented in a
fixed-base installation by adding a device to create the
35 required ba(t) motions and to sense them, e.g., a solenoid and
a linear encoder.
A second improvement is a difference from IMU-based
methods' presumption that some sort of navigation filter,
perhaps an extended Kalman filter, is estimating the vehicle
40 position and attitude. IMU-based spoofing detection meth-
ods rely on this navigation filter's estimated direction
cosines matrix A. The present method forms its own inde-
pendent estimate of A or of ra ATba in a globally convergent
manner. There is no possibility that failure or inaccuracy of
45 a full navigation filter could deteriorate its performance.
A third advantage of the new detection approach lies in
the design of its test statistic. IMU-based approaches tend to
rely on a general residuals test in the navigation filter. In the
present context, this amounts to considering only whether a
50 cost such as 7 o P(ra) in Eq. (40b) is small enough. The
present method also seeks to exploit the fact of sameness in
the ba(t)-correlated parts of the carrier phase variations
during a spoofing attack. Minimization of the cost function
in Eq. (21) represents an example of this approach. By
55 considering both J,,,,(i,,t) from Eq. (40b) and 7P(fl Pt)
from Eq. (21), the spoofing detection power of any given test
can be increased relative to a test that considers only the
residual errors relative to a non-spoofed signal model. Also,
there appears to be little or no literature for the IMU-based
6o approaches that discusses how to design a spoofing detection
threshold for a given probability of false alarm, how to
compute the corresponding probability of missed detection,
or how much motion and time are needed to achieve
reasonably low probabilities of false alarm and missed
65 detection.
Another advantage of the present system is that it could be
used on an UAV without the need for any inertial measure-
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ments. Rather than using an IMU to infer antenna motions
ba(t), a system based on the new approach could use
high-frequency dithering of one or more UAV control inputs
in order to create a suitable ba(t). Given known control input
dithering signals, ba(t) could be inferred from the transfer s
functions of a dynamic model of the UAV. This could be
especially effective if the GNSS antenna were mounted near
a wing tip and if the aileron input were the dithered control.
Alternatively, the antenna could be mounted on the tail, and
the elevator could be dithered. It is likely that an unknown io
scaling factor a would have to multiply a known nominal
b,,,_(t) in order to model the true ba(t), but this type of
re-scaling approach is already covered in Section VI.
Yet another advantage over IMU-based methods concerns
the particular carrier phase measurement that gets used. A 15
tightly coupled GPS/IMU system feeds the GPS observ-
ables, including pseudorange and possibly beat carrier
phase, into the Kalman filter. Unfortunately, the beat carrier
phase used is usually that produced by the carrier NCO. The
special processing of I1, and QPk accumulations associated 20
with FIG. 4 and Eq. (3) is not used. Therefore, the finite
bandwidth of the PLL can degrade the ability of this system
to discern the high-frequency carrier-phase variations, the
ones whose differences between the non-spoofed and
spoofed cases are central to spoofing detection. In addition, 25
the ability to detect and remove cycle slips, as outlined in
Subsection III.A, can be important to the success of carrier-
phase-based spoofing detection when high-frequency
antenna motions are used. Thus, it is unclear that a tightly
coupled GPS/IMU system could be relied on to produce the 30
most useful beat carrier phase information for purposes of
spoofing detection.
An ultra-tightly-coupled GPS/IMU system should have
none of these difficulties due to its use of the raw IPk and QPk
accumulations as its Kalman filter observables. The process- 35
ing suggested for conventional systems, however, does not
envision using an ultra-tightly-coupled GPS/IMU system for
spoofing detection.
One more advantage of the present method is its reduced
susceptibility to a very sophisticated spoofing attack. In 40
theory, a sophisticated spoofer could aim a high-bandwidth
relative position sensor at a victim UAV's GNSS antenna. It
could sense the high-frequency component of the actual
antenna motions and use that data to synthesize the equiva-
lent of the A~ P (T_i i spoofing signal given in Eq. (110). It 45
would only need to synthesize the correct A~ P (T_jd/) in the
bandwidth that was above the effective drift bandwidth of
the IMU. Below that bandwidth, it could spoof the signal at
will. Such an attack would go completely undetected by any
IMU-based single-antenna system. If the present approach 50
were used with concealed ba(t) motions, as under an opti-
cally opaque radome, then this new approach would not
have the same vulnerability.
Of course, if an IMU were present on a UAV, its outputs
could be used to aid in the determination of the high- 55
frequency components of ba(t). Such an approach would not
need to run the IMU data through a full navigation filter in
order to do GNSS spoofing detection. The high-pass pre-
filtering calculations of Eqs. (17) and (18) and the attitude
estimation calculations in, for example, Eqs. (40a)-(40c) or 60
(99a)-(99c) would obviate the need for data from a full
navigation solution.
XI. Summary and Conclusions
The present teachings have developed, analyzed, and
investigated methods to detect spoofing of GNSS signals. 65
The methods of the present teachings rely on measurements
of the beat carrier phase of multiple GNSS signals and on the
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impact on these measurements caused by intentional high-
frequency receiving location (in one instance, antenna
motion) motion. In one instance, dithering motion of a
victim receiver's antenna could be implemented by a sole-
noid, a cantilevered beam, or dithering of the controls of a
UAV. It should be noted that other methods of displacing the
location at which the GNSS signal is received are also within
the scope of these teachings. After detrending of the beat
carrier phase variations and the receiving location motion
using a high-pass filter, they can be matched to models of
their expected dependence on the known receiving location
(in one instance, antenna motion) motion. The model for the
non-spoofed case shows differing effects of the antenna
motion on the signals, but the spoofed case yields identical
effects due to spoofing geometry in which all of the false
signals originate from a single spoofer transmission antenna.
Spoofing detection hypothesis tests have been developed by
comparing the two models' ability to fit the measured data.
Some of these tests involve auxiliary estimation of attitude
or attitude-like parameters of the user system in lieu of a
priori attitude information. Precise detection tests have been
developed with spoofing detection thresholds that respect
upper limits on probabilities of false alarm or on worst-case
probabilities of false alarm. These tests also allow analysis
to determine probabilities of missed detection or worst-case
probabilities of missed detection.
The GNSS spoofing detection techniques of these teach-
ings have been tested both with Monte-Carlo simulations
and with live data. One set of live-data tests evaluated the
new techniques against a new sophisticated type of receiver/
spoofer, one that mimics all visible signals in a way which
foils standard receiver autonomous integrity monitoring
techniques. These tests were part of a specially authorized
event run at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico
under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security.
The new spoofing detection methods consistently yield false
alarm probabilities and missed detection probabilities on the
order of 10-5 or lower when working with typical numbers
of GPS signals available at typical patch-antenna signal
strengths. The needed antenna articulation peak-to-peak
deflections are modest, on the order of 4-6 cm. The tests at
White Sands Missile Range constitute the first known dem-
onstration of practical detection of live-signal spoofing
attacks mounted against a civilian GNSS receiver by a
dangerous new generation of receiver/spoofers.
A method is developed that processes Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS) beat carrier phase measurements
from a single moving antenna in order to determine whether
the GNSS signals are being spoofed. This technique allows
a specially equipped GNSS receiver to detect sophisticated
spoofing that cannot be detected using receiver autonomous
integrity monitoring techniques. It works for both encrypted
military signals and for unencrypted civilian signals. It does
not require changes to the signal structure of unencrypted
civilian GNSS signals. The method uses a short segment of
beat carrier-phase time histories that are collected while the
receiver's single antenna is undergoing a known, high-
frequency motion profile, typically one pre-programmed
into an antenna articulation system. The receiving location
(in one instance, antenna motion) also can be moving in an
unknown way at lower frequencies, as might be the case if
it were mounted on a ground vehicle, a ship, an airplane, or
a spacecraft. The spoofing detection algorithm correlates
high-pass-filtered versions of the known motion component
with high-pass-filtered versions of the carrier phase varia-
tions. True signals produce a specific correlation pattern, and
spoofed signals produce a recognizably different correlation
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pattern if the spoofer transmits its false signals from a single
antenna. The most pronounced difference is that non-
spoofed signals display variations between the beat carrier
phase responses of multiple signals, but all signals'
responses are identical in the spoofed case. These differing
correlation characteristics are used to develop a hypothesis
test in order to detect a spoofing attack or the lack thereof.
For moving-base receivers, there is no need for prior knowl-
edge of the vehicle's attitude. Instead, the detection calcu-
lations also provide a rough attitude measurement. Several
versions of this spoofing detection system have been
designed and tested. Some have been tested only with
truth-model data, but one has been tested with actual live-
signal data from the Global Positioning System (GPS) C/A
code on the LI frequency. The live-data tests correctly
identified spoofing attacks in the 4 cases out of 8 trials that
had actual attacks. These detections used worst-case false-
alarm probabilities of 10-6, and their worst-case probabili-
ties of missed detection were no greater than 1.6x10-6. The
ranges of antenna motion used to detect spoofing in these
trials were between 4 and 6 cm, i.e., on the order of a
quarter-cycle of the GPS LI carrier wavelength.
For the purposes of describing and defining the present
teachings, it is noted that the term "substantially" is utilized
herein to represent the inherent degree of uncertainty that
may be attributed to any quantitative comparison, value,
measurement, or other representation. The term "substan-
tially" is also utilized herein to represent the degree by
which a quantitative representation may vary from a stated
reference without resulting in a change in the basic function
of the subject matter at issue.
Herein, various functions, functionalities and/or opera-
tions may be described as being performed by or caused by
software program code to simplify description or to provide
an example. However, those skilled in the art will recognize
what is meant by such expressions is that the functions result
from execution of the program code/instructions by a com-
puting device as described above, e.g., including a proces-
sor, such as a microprocessor, microcontroller, logic circuit
or the like. Alternatively, or in combination, the functions
and operations can be implemented using special purpose
circuitry, with or without software instructions, such as
using Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) or
Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), which may be
programmable, partly programmable or hard wired. The
application specific integrated circuit ("ASIC") logic may be
such as gate arrays or standard cells, or the like, implement-
ing customized logic by metalization(s) interconnects of the
base gate array ASIC architecture or selecting and providing
metalization(s) interconnects between standard cell func-
tional blocks included in a manufacturer(s) library of func-
tional blocks, etc. Embodiments can thus be implemented
using hardwired circuitry without program software code/
instructions, or in combination with circuitry using pro-
grammed software code/instructions.
Control and data information can be electronically
executed and stored on computer-readable medium. Com-
mon forms of computer-readable (also referred to as com-
puter usable) media can include, but are not limited to
including, for example, a floppy disk, a flexible disk, a hard
disk, magnetic tape, or any other magnetic medium, a
CDROM or any other optical medium, punched cards, paper
tape, or any other physical or paper medium, a RAM, a
PROM, and EPROM, a FLASH-EPROM, or any other
memory chip or cartridge, or any other non-transitory
medium from which a computer can read. As stated in the
USPTO 2005 Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent
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Applications for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 1300 Off.
Gaz. Pat. Oflice 142 (Nov. 22, 2005), on the other hand, from
a technological standpoint, a signal encoded with functional
descriptive material is similar to a computer-readable
5 memory encoded with functional descriptive material, in
that they both create a functional interrelationship with a
computer. In other words, a computer is able to execute the
encoded functions, regardless of whether the format is a disk
or a signal.
10 Although the invention has been described with respect to
various embodiments, it should be realized these teachings
are also capable of a wide variety of further and other
embodiments within the spirit and scope of the appended
claims.
15 What is claimed is:
1. A method for determining whether a GNSS (Global
Navigation Satellite System) receiver has been spoofed, the
method comprising:
moving, using an articulation subsystem and a location
20 displacement component, a receiving location in a
predetermined articulation pattern while receiving
GNSS signals at the GNSS receiver;
high pass filtering, using a spoofing detection hypothesis
test component, carrier phase measurements of
25 received GNSS signals and the predetermined articu-
lation pattern; the high pass filtering resulting in esti-
mation of coeflicients in an expression for carrier phase
measurement residuals;
determining, using the spoofing detection hypothesis test
30 component, a likelihood cost function minimum for a
non-spoofed configuration; a likelihood cost function
being obtained from a ratio of probability density
functions;
results of the high pass filtering being used in determining
35 said likelihood cost function;
determining, using the spoofing detection hypothesis test
component, a minimum for another likelihood cost
function for a spoofed configuration; a spoofing detec-
tion hypothesis test statistic being a difference of said
40 another likelihood cost function minimum and said
likelihood cost function minimum; results of the high
pass filtering being used in determining said another
likelihood cost function; and
comparing, using the spoofing detection hypothesis test
45 component, the spoofing detection hypothesis test sta-
tistic to a predetermined threshold; the GNSS signals
deemed to be spoofed if the spoofing detection hypoth-
esis test statistic is less than the predetermined thresh-
old.
50 2. The method of claim 1 wherein frequencies of the
predetermined articulation pattern are substantially higher
than frequencies of motion of user equipment receiving the
GNSS signals.
3. The method of claim 1 wherein said another likelihood
55 cost function includes a dot product of a unit direction vector
from spoofer signal source to user equipment and a unit
vector for the predetermined-articulation pattern, vectors
being expressed in a reference coordinate system; and
wherein said likelihood cost function includes dot products
60 of a unit direction vector from each GNSS signal source and
the unit vector for the predetermined articulation pattern,
vectors being expressed in a reference coordinate system.
4. The method of claim 1 wherein the predetermined
threshold is obtained from a predetermined false alarm
65 probability.
5. The method of claim 1 wherein the predetermined
articulation pattern is uniaxial.
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6. The method of claim 1 wherein attitude of user equip-
ment receiving the GNSS signals is not known a priori.
7. The method of claim 1 wherein amplitude of the
predetermined articulation pattern is not known a priori.
8. The method of claim 1 wherein time phasing of the
predetermined articulation pattern is not known a priori.
9. The method of claim 1 wherein the predetermined
articulation pattern is multidimensional.
10. The method of claim 9 further comprising determining
whether a subset of the GNSS signals is being spoofed.
11. The method of claim 9 wherein said likelihood cost
function is a function of a direction cosines matrix for a
transformation from a reference coordinate system to a user
equipment coordinate system; wherein said another likeli-
hood function is a function of a unit direction vector from a
spoofer signal source to user equipment.
12. The method of claim 11 wherein an optimized direc-
tion cosines matrix is expressed in terms of an optimized
quaternion.
13. The method of claim 11:
wherein spoofing detection calculations involve minimi-
zation of said likelihood cost function and said another
likelihood cost function, said likelihood cost function
to determine an optimal direction cosines matrix and
said another likelihood cost function to determine an
optimal direction vector from the spooler; and
wherein the spoofing detection calculations involve cal-
culating a difference between a minimum of said
another likelihood cost function and a minimum of said
likelihood cost- function and comparison of a result to
a detection threshold to declare a spoofing attack if the
difference is below the detection threshold.
14. A system for determining whether a GNSS (Global
Navigation Satellite System) receiver has been spoofed, the
system comprising:
a receiving location displacement component configured
to move a receiving location with respect to a position
at which the user equipment processes GNSS signals;
an articulation subsystem configured to provide driving
signals to the receiving location displacement compo-
nent and to determine receiving location articulation;
the articulation subsystem moving a receiving location
in a predetermined articulation pattern while receiving
GNSS signals;
a number of midpoint sampler subsystems, each midpoint
sampler subsystem receiving input from a component
of one channel of a conventional GNSS receiver and
providing a beat carrier phase measurement for that one
channel; and
a spoofing detection hypothesis test component receiving:
location articulation, and
said beat carrier phase measurement for each one
channel and a PLL phase error discriminator value
for said each one channel, said beat carrier phase
measurement and said PLL phase error discriminator
value for said each one channel being used to obtain
a wideband estimate of beat carrier phase for said
each one channel, a number of accumulation mid
point times, each accumulation mid point time being
an accumulation mid point time for one channel, and
a number of unit direction vectors, each unit direc-
tion vector pointing from a GNSS signal source for
one channel;
said spoofing detection hypothesis test component con-
figured to:
high pass filter the wideband estimate of beat carrier
phase and the receiving location articulation for said
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each one channel; the high pass filtering resulting in
estimation of coefficients in an expression for a
wideband estimate of beat carrier phase residuals;
determine a likelihood cost function minimum for a
5 non-spoofed configuration; a likelihood cost func-
tion being obtained from a ratio of probability den-
sity functions; results of the high pass filtering being
used in determining said likelihood cost function;
determine a minimum for another likelihood cost func-
10 tion for a spoofed configuration; a spoofing detection
hypothesis test statistic being a difference of said
another likelihood cost function minimum and said
likelihood cost function minimum; results of the
high pass filtering being used in determining said
15 another likelihood cost function minimum; and
compare the spoofing detection hypothesis test statistic
to a predetermined threshold; the GNSS signals
deemed to be spoofed if the spoofing detection
hypothesis test statistic is less than the predetermined
20 threshold.
15. The system of claim 14 wherein said receiving loca-
tion displacement component is a receiver antenna mounting
component configured to enable moving a phase center of a
receiver antenna with respect to a mounting position at
25 which the receiver antenna mounting component is attached
to user equipment receiving the GNSS signals; and wherein
said receiving location articulation is antenna articulation.
16. The system of claim 15 wherein the receiver antenna
mounting component comprises a number of linking com-
30 ponents, each linking components, except a last linking
component, attached to a subsequent linking component
with a joint component, a first linking component attached
to user equipment by another joint component, a last linking
component attached between one joint component and the
35 receiver antenna, and a driving mechanism configured to
drive each linking component.
17. The system of claim 15 wherein the receiver antenna
mounting component comprises a drivable slidable compo-
nent; said drivable slidable component enabling motion in
40 one axis; said drivable slidable component disposed between
user equipment and die receiver antenna.
18. The system of claim 17 wherein said drivable slidable
component is a solenoid driver.
19. The system of claim 14 wherein the receiver antenna
45 mounting component comprises a cantilever beam disposed
between user equipment and the receiver antenna; a driving
component producing vibratory motion along an axis sub-
stantially perpendicular to an axis of the cantilever beam.
20. The system of claim 14 wherein frequencies of the
50 predetermined articulation pattern are substantially higher
than frequencies of motion of user equipment receiving the
GNSS signals.
21. The system of claim 14 wherein said likelihood cost
function includes dot products of a unit direction vector
55 from each GNSS signal source and the unit vector for the
predetermined articulation pattern, vectors being expressed
in a reference coordinate system; and wherein said another
likelihood cost function includes, a dot product of a unit
direction vector from a spoofer signal source to user equip-
60 ment and a unit vector for the predetermined articulation
pattern, vectors being expressed in a reference coordinate
system.
22. The system of claim 14 wherein the predetermined
threshold is obtained from a predetermined false alarm
65 probability.
23. The system of claim 14 wherein the predetermined
articulation pattern is uniaxial.
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24. The system of claim 14 wherein attitude of user
equipment receiving the GNSS signals is not known a priori.
25. The system of claim 14 wherein amplitude of the
predetermined articulation pattern is not known a priori.
26. The system of claim 14 wherein time phasing of the 5
predetermined articulation pattern is not known a priori.
27. The system of claim 14 wherein the predetermined
articulation pattern is multidimensional.
28. The system of claim 27 wherein said spoofing detec-
tion hypothesis test component is also configured to deter- io
mine whether a subset of the GNSS signals is being spoofed.
29. The system of claim 27 wherein said likelihood
function is a function of a direction cosines matrix for a
transformation from a reference coordinate system to a user
equipment coordinate system; wherein said another likeli- 15
hood function is a function of a unit direction vector from
the spooler signal source to user equipment.
30. The system of claim 29 wherein the spoofing detection
calculations compute an optimized value of said direction
cosines matrix that minimizes said likelihood cost function; 20
and wherein the spoofing detection calculations compute an
optimized value of said unit direction vector that minimizes
said another likelihood function.
31. The system of claim 29 wherein the optimized value
of said direction cosines matrix is expressed in terms of an 25
optimized quaternion.
